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INTRODUCTION

New Jersey has gained "a national reputation as a state that
promises swift and severe discipline" when lawyers stray beyond
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the bounds of propriety.' This reputation is particularly deserved in the area of trust account misappropriations and other
financial transgressions.2 On the occasion of announcing the
adoption of rules and procedures aimed at strengthening the attorney disciplinary system in 1984, New Jersey Supreme Court
Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz proclaimed, "New Jersey's disciplinary rules are among the toughest in the country, and we are
determined to have the most effective system for enforcing
them."' 3 NewJersey has remained in the vanguard, and the present disciplinary system is no doubt effective. The central inquiry
of this article is whether that system is fair to the accused.
A. Evolution of the Disciplinary System Since 1972
The attorney disciplinary system in New Jersey has been in a
state of flux during the past fifteen years,4 and the Supreme
Court of New Jersey has exercised initiative on several occasions
to re-examine and reform the disciplinary system in conjunction
with its exclusive constitutional authority to regulate the practice
of law in New Jersey.5
I Carter,Jersey Proves Tough Cop on Lawyer Misconduct, The Star-Ledger (Newark,
N.J.), Jan. 31, 1988, § 1, at 44, col. 1.
2 See generally Johnson, Lawyer, Thou Shall Not Steal, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 454
(1984). "New Jersey is in the vanguard nationally in its efforts to immediately remove from practice those attorneys who have objectively demonstrated larcenous
propensities." Id. at 505 & n.283. In In re Wilson, 81 NJ. 451,453, 409 A.2d 1153,
1154 (1979), the New Jersey Supreme Court announced a policy that has become
known as the "Wilson doctrine;" namely: "disbarment is the only appropriate discipline" where an attorney has "knowingly used his client's money." For an in-depth
analysis of Wilson and its progeny, see Johnson, supra at 475-87.
s Supreme Court Adopts New Rules for Attorney Disciplinary System, 113 N.J.L.J. 111
(1984).
4 Disciplinary systems nation-wide experienced a period of change and were
the subject of much investigation and debate during the early to mid-1970's. In
1970, the ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement
(Clark Committee) issued its report. ABA PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Final Draft 1970) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT]. In
February 1971, the Supreme Court of New Jersey appointed the Committee on
Enforcement of Ethical Standards (Kirchner Committee) to recommend ways of
improving the disciplinary framework in New Jersey. The Kirchner Committee
published its report in 1972. REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S COMMITTEE ON ENFORCEMENT OF ETHICAL STANDARDS, reprinted in 95 N.J.LJ. 253 (1972) (hereinafter
KIRCHNER REPORT]. The Kirchner Committee reviewed the CLARK REPORT as well
as reports by various similar committees in other states. See id.; see also Note, Enforcement of Legal Ethics in New Jersey, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 707 & nn.l-2 (1975).
For observations by an ethics practitioner during this era of flux, see Haines, Some
Observations and Suggestions About Disciplinary Proceedings, 98 N.J.L.J. 17 (1975).
5 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has exclusive responsibility to regulate admission to the New Jersey Bar, the conduct of New Jersey attorneys, the attorney-
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Prior to 1973, the attorney disciplinary system in New Jersey
was comprised of twenty-one loosely administered county ethics
committees functioning under the predecessor to current New
Jersey Court Rule 1:20. 6 Responding to recommendations for
greater centralization of the administration, investigation and
prosecution of ethics matters, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in 1973, established an office known as Central Ethics within the
Administrative Office of the Courts. 7 The Bar and the public,
however, continued to voice concerns regarding perceived inequities caused by parochialism and favoritism at the county committee level."
In 1978, the Supreme Court of New Jersey substantially reorganized the attorney disciplinary system by establishing a statewide mandatory fee arbitration program with District Fee Arbitration Committees, 9 by replacing the County Ethics Committees
client relationship and the discipline of members of the New Jersey Bar. N.J.
CONST. art. VI, § II,
3. All ethics proceedings, disciplinary or otherwise, are
deemed filed in the Supreme Court of New Jersey and conducted before various
bodies created by the supreme court to assist it in exercising its constitutional mandate. In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 225-26, 358 A.2d 787, 789 (1976). In addition to its
traditional adjudicatory role, the supreme court is vested with investigatory and
prosecutorial power over ethics matters.
6 For an overview of the system as it existed circa 1972, see KIRCHNER REPORT,
supra note 4, at 258, col. 3. For a description of the system by the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in 1976, see In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 226-27, 358 A.2d 787, 789-90
(1976). For a description of the pre-1947 arrangement, see State v. Rush, 46 N.J.
399, 411, 217 A.2d 441, 447 (1966).
7 The Kirchner Committee recommended establishment of a centralized investigating staff within the Administrative Office of the Courts to provide on-going
supervision and investigation by personnel trained and experienced in ethics matters. KIRCHNER REPORT, supra note 4, at 262, col. 3. As an alternative, the Kirchner
Committee suggested utilization of investigators on the staffs of county prosecutors
as provided under the then existing court rule 1:20-2(c). Id. (citing N.J. CT. R.
1:20-2(c) (1972)).
8 KIRCHNER REPORT, supra note 4, at 258, col. 4. See also Supreme Court and General Council Discuss Ethics Committees, 98 N.J.L.J. at 875, col. 2 (1975). At the first
meeting between the General Council of the New Jersey State Bar Association and
the New Jersey Supreme Court on October 3, 1975, the bench and bar debated
whether county ethics committees should be retained and whether a centralized
state-wide body should be established to supervise or supersede the existing county
committees. Id. Disparate results are often obtained for similar ethics transgressions occurring in different counties due to a lack of centralization. See Haines,
supra note 4, at 26, col. 1.
9 This article will not deal with the fee arbitration process, under the NJ. Court
Rules, or with the functions of other supreme court committees that are involved in
ethics matters, e.g., the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, N.J. CT. R.
1:19-1; the Committee on Attorney Advertising, see id. R. 1: 19A- 1; the Ethics Financial Committee, see id. R. 1:20B-1; Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law Committee, see id. R. 1:22-1; the Client's Security Fund see id. R. 1:28.
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with District Ethics Committees (DEC's) and by creating the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) empowered with state-wide jurisdiction. l The creation of the DRB as an intermediate forum
promised greater uniformity of result. The supreme court also
changed the name of its central investigatory and prosecutorial
arm from Central Ethics to the Division of Ethics and Professional Services (DEPS). l" The 1978 reorganization did not, however, redistribute authority for initial receipt, investigation and
adjudication of ethics complaints from the regional committee
level to more centralized control by DEPS or the DRB. 12
On September 2, 1981, a decade after the establishment of
the Kirchner Committee, Chief Justice Wilentz announced the
establishment of a new committee, the Committee on Attorney
Disciplinary Structure (Structure Committee) to re-evaluate the
disciplinary system.'" The Structure Committee was entrusted
with responsibility to study the operations and efficiency of the
existing disciplinary system and to report its analysis and recommendations for improvement to the court. In charging the Structure Committee, Chief Justice Wilentz stated:
The Supreme Court is intensely interested and committed to
the proper functioning of all aspects of our judicial system,
and one of the most important Court functions is the supervision of the State's practicing lawyers. This task has become
more complex and difficult with the recent increase in the
number of lawyers admitted to the Bar. Therefore, we have
determined that now is the time for both the Court and the
organized Bar to reassess the functioning of the ethics and fee
dispute process.' 4
Over the twelve month period following its establishment, the
10 See S. PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES R. 1:20 comment (Gann). Further innovations were incorporated into the 1979 rule revisions, including the addition of lay members to the DEC's. Id.
I IId.
12 The 1978 rule amendments did provide the Administrative Director of the
Courts with discretionary authority to supersede the investigative function of the
regional committees; the Supreme Court or the DRB could also direct the Administrative Director to initiate and conduct investigations.
13 ATrORNEY DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURE COMMrTEE REPORT ON ATrORNEY DisciPLINARY STRUCTURE, reprintedin 110 NJ.L.J. 464-A (1982) [hereinafter DISCIPLINARY
STRUCTURE COMMrrrEE REPORT]. The Structure Committee was comprised of a
cross-section of members of the Bar and was chaired by then retired New Jersey
Supreme Court Justice Mark A. Sullivan. Id. The Structure Committee's final report was published in the New Jersey Law Journal for the benefit of the entire Bar
on October 21, 1982. Id. See supra note 4 (discussing the creation of the Kirchner
Committee).
14 DISCIPLINARY STRUCTURE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 464-A, col 2.
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Structure Committee ambitiously conducted nation-wide research,
reviewed various reports prepared by other similar committees empaneled in other jurisdictions, solicited views from the Bar, and issued a report of its findings and recommendations. In July 1983,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced approval of virtually
all of the recommendations set forth in the Structure Committee's
final report, including the establishment of a more powerful central
investigatory and prosecutorial unit answerable directly to the court,
denominated the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE). 1 5 This reformation achieved further centralization and fostered greater uniformity
of enforcement by focusing authority for administration, investigation and prosecution in one agency. Consequently, New Jersey
Court Rule 1:20, governing discipline of members of the Bar, was
comprehensively revised effective February 15, 1984.16
During the past fifteen years, the size and characteristics of the
New Jersey Bar have changed significantly. The attorney population
in New Jersey has doubled. When the supreme court established
the Office of Central Ethics in 1973, there were less than 15,000
attorneys in the New Jersey Bar. 17 By December 1987, that total
had increased to over 35,000.18 A concomitant but more dramatic
growth in disciplinary matters is reflected in the statistics for the
same time period; the number of cases in which final public discipline was imposed increased from only eighteen cases in 1973," 9 to
fifty-five cases in 1987.20 Twenty private reprimands were also imposed in 1987.21
The innovations which have been implemented over the past
fifteen years have significantly modernized and improved New
Jersey's attorney disciplinary enforcement framework. The present
system serves the Bar and the public with greater uniformity and
efficiency. Continued evolution is both necessary and desirable,
however. Future rule revisions should be aimed, among other
22
things, at further clarifying procedures, safeguarding respondents'
Supreme Court Announces New Office of Attorney Ethics, 112 N.J.L.J. 93 (1983).
Supreme Court Adopts New Rules For Attorney Disciplinary System, 113 N.J.L.J. 111
(1984).
17 Johnson, supra note 2, at 461 (figure 2).
18 Office of Attorney Ethics of the Supreme Court of NewJersey, 1987 STATE OF
THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY SYsTEM REPORT, 1 (1988) [hereinafter 1987 OAE
15
16

REPORT].

19 Johnson, supra note 2, at 457 (figure 1).
1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 57 (figure 20).
Id. at 65 (figure 25).
The term "respondent" is used to refer to an attorney accused of unethical
conduct. See N.J. CT. R. 1:20.
20
21
22
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rights, fostering greater efficiency and promoting the unhindered
opportunity of grievants 23 to seek review and redress of alleged
misconduct.2 4
B.

The Judicially Articulated Goals of the System

In order to analyze the present disciplinary framework, it is
necessary to reflect upon the stated legitimate purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings:
The true purpose and function of disciplinary proceedings must ever be kept uppermost in mind. Discipline is not
imposed to punish the lawyer who transgresses. It is imposed
in order that the public shall have continued confidence that
the profession will purge itself of lawyers unable or unwilling
to measure up to the high standards of honor and moral decency by which we govern our professional conduct-and that
we will do so, not to enhance our own self-esteem, but solely
to further the end that public respect for the purity of the administration of justice shall not waiver or diminish. That respect is a first essential of a democracy; the confidence of the
people in the administration of justice is a prime requisite for
free representative government. It would be tragic indeed if
that confidence and respect should be lost out of public suspicion, be it ever so slight, that the profession cannot be counted
upon courageously to rid its ranks of those who by their serious misconduct demonstrate their contempt for the profes25
sional ideals which earn that respect and confidence for us.
Notwithstanding these lofty ideals and laudatory concerns, the
disciplinary process often results in the imposition of sanctions,
ranging from private reprimands to disbarment. Subjection to public sanction is often accompanied by degradation of reputation and
decimation of livelihood. Analogies can be drawn to the criminal
justice system and the fines and punishments there imposed. 6 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey has, however, repeatedly emphasized
that its goal in disciplinary matters is to protect the public rather
23 The term "grievant" is used to refer to the individual or entity, usually a dissatisfied client, who has filed a "grievance" alleging attorney misconduct. See id.
24 For discussion of current concerns, see Jaffe, National Bar Groups to Launch
Review of Lawyers Ethics, DisciplineRules, The Sunday Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.),Jan.
3, 1988, § 1, at 10, col. 1.
25 In re Frankel, 20 N.J. 588, 602, 120 A.2d 603, 610-11 (1956) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175, 201-02, 364 A.2d 777, 791 (1976)
("We have no great zeal to impose sanctions on individuals for disciplinary infractions. Our foremost concern is to guarantee that members of the bar represent the
interests of their clients in keeping with the public trust.").
26 See infra notes 137-67 and accompanying text.
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than to punish the transgressing attorney.2 7
Commenting on its power to regulate the Bar, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey has stated that, "the touchstone of [the court's]
disciplinary power is to fashion a sanction which fulfills [its] trust to
the public and the profession, edifies the Bar and isfair andjust to the
respondent."2 8 The main thrust of this article is to explore whether
the disciplinary system, in its current state, is "fairandjust" to attorneys who are called upon to defend themselves against allegations
of impropriety. In that endeavor, it is necessary to first review the
applicable rules and consider their intricate interplay.
II.

GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE DISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK IN

NEW JERSEY

The discipline of members of the NewJersey Bar is primarily
governed by New Jersey Court Rule 1:20.29 As discussed above,
exclusive constitutional responsibility over all aspects of the practice of law resides in the Supreme Court of New Jersey," ° includ27 See, e.g., In re Perez, 104 N.J. 316, 327, 517 A.2d 123, 129 (1986); In re Robinovitz, 102 N.J. 57, 62, 505 A.2d 595, 598 (1986); In re McDonald, 99 N.J. 78, 84,
491 A.2d 625, 628 (1985); In re Goldstein, 97 N.J. 545, 548, 482 A.2d 942, 943
(1984); In re Infinito, 94 N.J. 50, 57, 462 A.2d 160, 162 (1983); In re Goldstaub, 90
N.J. 1, 5, 446 A.2d 1192, 1194 (1982); In re Stout, 75 N.J. 321, 325, 382 A.2d 630,
632 (1978); In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 227, 358 A.2d 787, 790 (1976). While these
authorities stand for the proposition that punishment is not a legitimate goal of the
disciplinary process, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently stated that the purpose "is not so much to punish a wrongdoer as it is to protect the public." In re Rigolosi,
107 N.J. 192, 206, 526 A.2d 670, 679 (1987) (emphasis added). This language
implies that punishment is a legitimate goal of the process, albeit not the primary
goal. This semantical nuance may connote a shift toward judicial approval of the
imposition of punishment as a proper aim of ethics proceedings in addition to the
well-recognized primary goals-protection of the public and preservation of the
purity of the Bar and judicial system. Punishment had been recognized as a legitimate goal in the past, however. See In re Ries, 131 N.J.L. 559, 562, 37 A.2d 417, 419
(Sup. Ct. 1944) ("[Tlhe object of disciplinary proceedings is not alone to punish the
attorney guilty of malpractice.") (emphasis added).
28 In re Vasser, 75 N.J. 357, 364, 382 A.2d 1114, 1117 (1978) (emphasis added).
See also In re Pleva, 106 N.J. 637, 641, 525 A.2d 1104, 1106 (1987) ("[I]n making
disciplinary decisions, we must consider the interests of the public as well as of the
bar and the individual involved."); In re Templeton, 99 N.J. 365, 374, 492 A.2d
1001, 1006-07 (1985) ("An inquiry into [the] possible causes of ethical misconduct
not only can be instructive and enlightening, it may also hold the promise of a
resolution of the disciplinary charges in terms of personal rehabilitation, which will
serve to protect the public interest without ruining a lawyer's career and life.").
29 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-1 to -12. For a concise summary of the disciplinary process
authored by David E. Johnson, Jr., Director of the OAE, see Johnson, What Every
Lawyer Needs to Know About Ethics, 118 NJ.L.J. 325, 343, col. 3 (1986). See also the
synopsis set forth in the 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 1-6.
SO See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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ing original and appellate jurisdiction"' and plenary rule-making

power.32
The system is three-tiered;3 3 the three adjudicative levels
are: (1) hearing panels comprised of members of the seventeen
regionalized DEC's 3 4 or, alternatively, special ethics masters,3 5
(2) the state-wide DRB, 36 and (3) the Supreme Court of New
Jersey.17 The OAE performs various functions and roles at all
31 In re LiVolsi, 85 N.J. 576, 428 A.2d 1268 (1981). See also In re Hearing on
Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 678, 477 A.2d 339, 343 (1984); In
re Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 73-75, 462 A.2d 165, 172 (1983); In re Education Law
Center, Inc., 86 N.J. 124, 133, 429 A.2d 1051, 1056 (1981); In re Loring, 73 N.J.
282, 289, 374 A.2d 466, 470 (1977); In re Cipriano, 68 N.J. 398, 402, 346 A.2d 393,
395 (1975); American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J.
258, 261, 330 A.2d 350, 352 (1974); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 411, 217 A.2d 441,
447 (1966) (all recognizing Supreme Court of New Jersey is vested with constitutional duty to exercise exclusive authority over attorney discipline). On applicability of the federal non-interference doctrine, see Gipson v. New Jersey Supreme
Court, 416 F. Supp. 1129 (D.N.J. 1976), aft'd, 558 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1977). "That
the States have broad power to regulate the practice of law is, of course, beyond
question." United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). "United Mine also recognizes that the 'broad power' may
be exercised by the adoption of 'broad rules framed to protect the public and to
preserve respect for the administration ofjustice.' " American Trial Lawyers Ass'n
v. NewJersey Supreme Court, 126 N.J. Super. 577, 585, 316 A.2d 19, 23 (App. Div.
1974).
32 E.g., American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. NewJersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258,
262-63, 330 A.2d 350, 352 (1974). The supreme court has delegated some of its
rulemaking power to the OAE and the DRB. Court rule 1:20-2(b)(14) authorizes
the OAE to promulgate guidelines governing the procedures to be followed in disciplinary proceedings. See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-2(b)(14). The OAE has promulgated
twenty-eight administrative guidelines as well as various forms for use with regard
to ethics proceedings. Office of Attorney Ethics, Administrative Guidelines of the Office
of Attorney Ethics, in RULES GOVERNING THE NEW JERSEY DISCIPLINARY AND FEE ARBITRATION SYSTEM (1987) [hereinafter OAE Guidelines]. See 113 N.J.L.J. 157 (1984);
1 NEW JERSEY PRACTICE 678-98 (4th ed. 1988). Court rules 1:20-4(b)(6) and (d)
authorize the DRB to promulgate regulations governing proceedings and matters
coming before the DRB. The DRB has promulgated five regulations together with
forms. See N.J. Ct. R. 1:20-4(b)(6), -4(b). Office of Attorney Ethics, DisciplinaryReview Board Regulations, in RULES GOVERNING THE NEW JERSEY DISCIPLINARY AND FEE
ARBITRATION SYSTEM (1987) [hereinafter DRB Regulations]. The above pamphlet
entitled, RULES GOVERNING THE NEW JERSEY DISCIPLINARY AND FEE ARBITRATION
SYSTEM (1987), which contains the OAE Guidelines and the DRB Regulations, can
be obtained from the OAE's offices in Trenton.
33 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 456, n. 1; see also Johnson, supra note 29, at 343,
col. 3.
34 See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3.
35 Retired jurists are recruited to act as special masters in lieu of DEC hearing
panels in complex cases. OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 17 at 11.
See also infra note 67. While District Fee Arbitration Committees are also at this first
tier, fee disputes will not be discussed in detail here. See supra note 9.
36 See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-4.
37 See id. R. 1:20-5.
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three levels. 38

The proceedings before the DEC's and special ethics masters, as well as proceedings before the DRB, are considered ab
initio to be judicial in nature.39 However, the function of these
tribunals is in large part advisory; they have no authority to impose public discipline,4" but can only make recommendations to
the court.4 ' The DEC's, special ethics masters and the DRB are
agents acting on behalf of the supreme court, which is the ultimate arbiter of all ethics matters.4 2 These three tiers will be examined in greater detail in the following paragraphs.
A.

Tier One-District Ethics Committees and Special Ethics Masters

The initial tier in the disciplinary system, though not necessarily the first tier with which the respondent will interact, consists of the DEC's, which are organized primarily along county
lines. 4 - The DEC's ordinarily receive and take initial investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative action upon grievances alleging unethical conduct on the part of New Jersey attorneys.44 In
matters deemed emergent by the OAE Director, initial application may be made to the DRB or directly to the court.4 5
Generally, grievances are initially directed to and received by
38 See id. R. 1:20-2. See also infra text accompanying notes 114-30 (discussing the
expanding role of the Office of Attorney Ethics). See also 1987 OAE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 12-24.
39 In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 226, 358 A.2d 787, 789 (1976).
40 Private reprimands, however, can be imposed at these lower tiers. See N.J. CT.
R. 1:20-4(f)(2) (authorizing DRB to impose private reprimands); N.J. CT. R. 1:204(h) (authorizing DRB to impose costs and sanctions). Private reprimands by the
Director can be imposed with concurrence of the DRB at the investigative stage if
the respondent consents. N.J. CT. R. 1:20- 3 (g); 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18,
at 66.
41 See Gipson v. Supreme Court of NewJersey, 416 F. Supp. 1129, 1131 (D.N.J.
1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1977).
42 See In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 225, 358 A.2d 787, 789 (1976).
43 See OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 1. Due to large lawyer
populations, Essex County is divided into three district committees (V-A, V-B and
V-C), and Bergen County is divided into two districts (II-A and 11-B). Id. Less
populous counties are combined within the jurisdiction of a single committee, e.g.,
district I is comprised of the counties. of Atlantic, Cape May, Cumberland and Salem. Id.
44 See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(e); OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 3.
Attorneys admitted pro hac vice under court rule 1:21-2 are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of New Jersey. In re Bailey, 57 N.J. 451, 273 A.2d 563 (1971).
Such matters are assigned to committees by the Director of the OAE. N.J. CT. R.
1:20-2(b) (6), -3(e).
45 See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-2(b)(1)(i); see also infra notes 107-13 and accompanying
text (discussing emergent applications).
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the secretary of the appropriate DEC, who screens each case in
accordance with applicable OAE Guidelines and court rules.4 6
Grievances are not required to be in any particular form, and
those filed by disgruntled clients may consist of nothing more
than an informal letter expressing general dissatisfaction. The
following types of cases are screened out at the DEC level
through this process: (1) grievances involving elements of both
an allegation of unethical conduct and a fee dispute;4 7 (2) grievances related to advertising or similar communications;4
(3) grievances by criminal defendants charging ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct; 49 (4) grievances relating to pending civil litigation;50 and (5) complaints against
ethics committee members or secretaries arising out of the
processing of a grievance. 5
DEC secretaries are also required to screen out grievances
"[w]hen the facts alleged in the initial letter of grievance would
not, even if proved, constitute unethical conduct. ' 52 However, if
the grievant insists that the grievance sets forth a viable cause of
action, the secretary must accept and docket the grievance and
refer it to a designated investigator for investigation and a second opinion.5 3 DEC secretaries also screen out grievances in46 See OAE Guidelines supra note 32, Guideline No. 3. The DEC secretaries are
appointed by the Director of the OAE after consultation with the DRB Chair, and
they are not members of the DEC's. N.J. CT. R. 1:20-2(b)(11), 1:20-3(c).
47 N.J. CT. R. 1:20A-4, 1:20-3(e). If a grievance involves "aspects of both a fee
dispute and a charge of unethical conduct," the matter is to be first acted upon by
the respective fee arbitration committee, unless (1) the Director otherwise directs,
or (2) the respective fee arbitration committee refers the matter as presenting "an
ethical question of a serious or emergent nature." Id.
48 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(e). Grievances that involve controverted issues of material
fact or charges of unethical conduct of a non-advertising and non-communicative
nature may be referred to the DEC by the Committee on Attorney Advertising. Id.
R. l:19A-4(e), (h).
49 OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 8. Unless a patent violation of
the rules of ethics has occurred, such grievances can only be filed after appellate
remedies have been exhausted. Id.
50 OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 9. Grievances relating to pending civil litigation are to be entertained only at the conclusion of such litigation
unless an ethical question of obvious significance or of an emergent nature is
presented. Id.
51 OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 7. Grievances against DEC
members or secretaries arising out of the investigation, prosecution or adjudication
of a grievance are considered exclusively by the DRB and the Supreme Court. Id.,
commentary at 4-5.
52 Id. Guideline No. 3.
53 Id. Guideline No. 6 (citing NJ. CT. R. 1:20-3(0). In such a case, an experienced DEC member must investigate the grievance and file a written report within
45 days. Id.
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volving attorneys whose principal offices are not within their
respective DEC's geographic jurisdiction. 54
Grievances which survive this initial screening process are
assigned to lawyer-members of the committee, referred to as
"preliminary investigators, ' 55 who conduct investigations to determine the validity of the grievant's allegations.56 Preliminary
investigations are required to be completed within sixty days unless extraordinary circumstances exist. 57 Preliminary investiga-

tors should forward a copy of the grievance letter to the
respondent for comment and may also subpoena documents and
witnesses during the course of their investigations. 58 The respondent should make every effort to respond to and resolve the
grievance at this initial investigative stage. Any grievance, no
matter how trivial the underlying accusation may seem, should be
treated as a potential blemish on the attorney's record and reputation. Prompt forwarding of exculpatory information at this
early but critical juncture can mean the difference between a dismissal or the filing of formal charges. In all but the most de
minimis matters, the respondent should expeditiously seek the
assistance of experienced ethics defense counsel at the preliminary investigation stage.
Upon completion of the preliminary investigation, the investigator is required to submit a written report of the investigation
to the DEC Chair. 59 The DEC Chair must then determine
whether there is an indication of unethical conduct sufficient to
warrant a formal hearing. 6° If the Chair determines on the information then available that a formal hearing is not warranted, the
Chair directs the committee secretary to dismiss the matter.6 '
54 See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(e). Cases are generally referred to and investigated by
the DEC in the district where the attorney maintains his or her principal office for
the practice of law in this state. Id.
55 See id. R. 1:20-3(o).
56 d.
57 See OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 10 (discussing the timetable
for completing preliminary investigations).
58 See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(f), (o); OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No.
14. Subpoenas issue on application of the DEC or OAE Director. At other stages
of the process, presenters, ethics counsel and respondents can apply for issuance of
a subpoena. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 218-21 (discussing these
procedures).
59 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(f); OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 10.
60 See infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing formal hearings).
61 If the matter is to be closed, copies of the investigative report must be furnished to the grievant, the Director and the respondent, and a letter of dismissal
must be forwarded to each. OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 18.
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Once this occurs, the investigative stage of the matter is
terminated.62
If the DEC Chair determines that the facts set forth in the
investigative report demonstrate that misconduct has occurred,
the Chair may then recommend to the OAE Director that a private reprimand be imposed 63 or direct the preparation of a formal complaint which will then be followed by a plenary hearing."
In the latter case, the complaint is served upon the respondent,
who is required to file a verified answer within ten days. 65 This is
the next critical stage of the process, and the respondent should
treat the complaint as a serious matter. If ethics counsel has not
yet been retained, the respondent should retain counsel immediately in order to timely file the necessary and crucial responsive
pleadings.
Formal hearings are conducted in private before a DEC
hearing panel comprised of at least three DEC members, usually
two lawyer-members and one lay-member. 66 In complex or time62 It is estimated that 80 percent of all grievances are disposed of at this stage.
1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 5.
63 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(f), (g). If the DEC Chair requests the Director to recommend to the DRB that a private reprimand be imposed, it is then within the discretion of the Director to so recommend or to direct the Committee to further process
the matter pursuant to rule 1:20-3(f) or (h). If the Director recommends that a
private reprimand be imposed by the DRB, a letter of intent to do so is served upon
the respondent, who may object within 10 days, in which case a formal complaint
will be filed pursuant to rule 1:20-3(h). Id. R. 1:20-3 (g). If no timely objection is
made, then the Chair of the DRB has discretion to authorize the issuance of the
private reprimand in the name of the DRB, in accordance with rule 1:20-4(f)(2), or
direct that formal proceedings commence, in accordance with rule 1:20-3(h). Id.
64 Id. R. 1:20-3(f), (h), (1).

65 Id. R. 1:20-3(i); OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 12 (discussing
the manner of service). The respondent must set forth his or her demand for discovery in the answer or respondent's right to discovery "shall be waived." N.J. CT.
R. 1:20-3(i); OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 15. See infra notes 20724 and accompanying text (discussing discovery in further detail). Respondent may
retain counsel, request assigned counsel if indigent, or appear pro se. N.J. CT. R.
1:20-3(k); OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 13. Failure to file timely
answer constitutes unethical conduct. See infra notes 176-83 and accompanying
text.
66 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(1). The DEC member acting as preliminary investigator for
the matter in question may not be assigned by the Chair to serve on the hearing
panel for that matter. Id.; see In re Logan, 71 N.J. 583, 586, 367 A.2d 4i9, 421
(1976). Hearings are transcribed, and while formal, the Rules of Evidence do not
stricdy apply. N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(1). In accordance with Rule 1:20-3(n) and OAE
Guideline No. 11, all actions of the hearing panel are to be taken by vote of a
simple majority. OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 11. The panel's
report is not to be reviewed or voted on by the committee en banc. Whenever
possible, the panel is to render its report orally, immediately upon conclusion of
the case, and the transcript thereof immediately ordered. Id. However, the OAE
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consuming cases, a special ethics master may be appointed to
hear the matter in lieu of a hearing panel. The filing of legal
briefs is not required at this stage; however, it may be advisable
to file pre-hearing briefs, affidavits or stipulations.
Upon completion of the presentation of evidence and argument, and after due deliberation, the panel or special master may
take one of the following three actions: (1) the complaint may be
dismissed if it is determined that no unethical conduct has occurred;6 8 (2) a determination may be made that a private reprimand constitutes "adequate discipline" for the conduct in
question;69 or (3) a "presentment" may be filed with the DRB
determining that the matter requires discipline greater than a
private reprimand, and recommending public discipline.7 °
B.

Tier Two-The Disciplinary Review Board

If a grievant's claim of unethical conduct has been dismissed
at the investigative or hearing stage by either the DEC Chair or
by the hearing panel, an appeal may be filed with the DRB. 7 1 The
DRB automatically reviews all presentments filed by DEC's or
special masters recommending public discipline.7 2 If ethics
counsel has not been retained before reaching this stage, the respondent should seriously reconsider that decision.
The DRB is composed of nine members, at least five of
considers no report final until reduced to final written form and duly signed. Id. at
8 comment. Thus, hearing panels are instructed to render oral reports in secret
and the parties not made privy until the report is filed in final form with the DEC
secretary. Id. The report must set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law.
N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(n).
67 See supra note 35. Special ethics masters are empowered to act with the same
power and authority as that of a hearing panel in accordance with rule 1:20-3(1),
and special masters are required to submit written reports in accordance with rule
1:20-3(m) and (n). NJ. CT. R. 1:20-3(1), 3(m)-(n).
68 NJ. CT. R. 1:20-3(n)(1).
69 Id. R. 1:20-3(n)(2).
70 Id. R. 1:20-3(n)(3). In such a case, the hearing panel is not required to recommend the specific type or severity of public discipline to be imposed ultimately by
the court, which determination is reserved to the DRB. Id.; see also id. R. 1:204(f)(1).
71 Id. R. 1:20-4(e)(1)(i)-(ii); DRB Regulations, supra note 32, Regulation Nos. 23. An appeal can be filed by the grievant, the Director or the respondent. The only
first tier actions subject to appeal are pre- and post-hearing dismissals. N.J. CT. R.
1:20-4(e)(1)(i)-(ii). Therefore the respondent's right to appeal is illusory since all
presentments are automatically reviewed by the DRB, and respondents would have
no reason to appeal a dismissal. Query: should the lay grievant have the right to
appeal a dismissal thereby prolonging the process?
72 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-4(f)(1).
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whom must be members of the New Jersey Bar, and at least three
of whom cannot be attorneys.73 Members are appointed by the
74
court and serve for three-year terms, subject to reappointment.
The court also designates the members who serve as Chair and
Vice-Chair on an annual basis. 75 DRB members receive no pecuniary remuneration. 76
When a hearing panel has found unethical conduct warranting either private or public discipline, its written report is forwarded to and considered by the DRB. On appeal from final
action or a recommendation for imposition of discipline by a
DEC hearing panel, review by the DRB is de novo on the full
record. 77 Oral argument is discretionary on appeals from dismissals and reviews of post-hearing private reprimand recommendations, but automatic at the request of any party or the DRB on
review of presentments recommending public discipline.78 On
appeals from DEC dismissals, the DRB may affirm, modify, reverse or remand the matter.7 9
Upon review of post-hearing recommendations for private
reprimand, the DRB may dismiss the grievance, impose the private reprimand or treat the recommendation as a presentment
for public discipline. 0 Thus, where proceedings at the first tier
result in dismissal or recommendation of a private reprimand,
the DRB has discretion to recommend imposition of a greater
sanction following its de novo review. Therefore, the respondent
and his or her counsel must remain vigilant notwithstanding success at the DEC level.
Where a DEC hearing panel or special master has recommended public discipline, oral argument is routinely scheduled
before the DRB. 1 While briefs are not required to be filed under
the rules governing proceedings at the second tier, they can be
helpful to the respondent and are routinely filed by experienced
73

Id. R. 1:20-4(a).

74

Id.

75 Id.
76

1987 OAE

REPORT,

supra note 18, at 5.

77 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-4(e)(3), (f)(1)-(2).
78

Id.

79 Id. R. 1:20-4(e)(3).

Decisions must be in writing. Id. While the DRB may
affirm recommendations, or impose and issue private reprimands and costs, the
supreme court has reserved the power to impose public discipline. See supra note
40. Further, where a presentment is filed recommending public discipline, a downgrade by the DRB to a private reprimand must be reviewed by the supreme court.
See infra text accompanying note 87.
80 NJ. CT. R. 1:20-4(f)(2).
81 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
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ethics defense counsel.8" The DRB, in its discretion, may also
request the filing of briefs.83 A hearing panel member or an OAE
staff attorney will appear to prosecute the matter.84 While the
respondent may appear pro se, representation by counsel is
advised. 85
The DRB, like the DEC's, must render formal written decisions." If the DRB determines that public discipline is appropriate, or that a recommendation for public discipline should be
down-graded to a private reprimand or be dismissed, the DRB's
written recommendation must be promptly filed with the
supreme court for de novo review.87
C.

Tier Three-The Supreme Court of New Jersey

The third and ultimate tier, absent a constitutional challenge
cognizable in a federal forum, is the Supreme Court of New
Jersey. The supreme court is obligated to independently review
the record and to make its own findings. 8 The supreme court
ordinarily places great weight on DRB recommendations,8 9 but
will not hesitate to reach a different result based upon its independent review of the record."°
The court may pass judgment on a disciplinary matter without oral argument where the DRB has recommended discipline
of one year or less. Thus, where the DRB recommends a public
reprimand, probation or a six-month suspension, the court may
implement and affirm that decision without hearing respondent
or counsel. It is, therefore, important that respondent timely
82
83
84

1.

See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-4(e)(2).
E.g., id. R. 1:20-4(0(2). See also Johnson, supra note 29, at 344, col. 4.
See 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6; Johnson, supra note 29, at 344, col.

85 SeeJohnson, supra note 29, at 344, col. 5. Respondents should not appear pro
se except where the violations charged and the conduct of the respondent (charged
or uncharged) is de minimis in the aggregate. See infra text accompanying notes
225-30.
86 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-4(f)(1).
87

Id.

88 Id. R. 1:20-5(a). See, e.g., In re Perez, 104 N.J. 316, 327, 517 A.2d 123, 129
(1986) (supreme court states it is "mindful of [its] obligation of independent findings of fact").
89 In re Kushner, 101 N.J. 397, 403, 505 A.2d 32, 35 (1986); In re Rosen, 88 N.J.
1, 3, 438 A.2d 316, 317 (1981); In re Mirabelli, 79 N.J. 597, 602, 401 A.2d 1090,
1093 (1979).
90 See, e.g., In re Conway, 107 N.J. 168, 183, 526 A.2d 658, 665 (1987); In re
Rigolosi, 107 N.J. 192, 207-08, 526 A.2d 670, 679-80 (1987); In re Kushner, 101
N.J. 397, 403, 505 A.2d 32, 35 (1986); In re Infinito, 94 N.J. 50, 58, 462 A.2d 160,
164 (1983); In re Rosen, 88 N.J. 1, 3-4, 438 A.2d 316, 317 (1981).
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seek leave to file a brief with the court, particularly if additional
facts or new precedents should be addressed. 9 '
Where a constitutional challenge has been raised and preserved by the respondent, a notice of petition for review must be
filed with the Supreme Court of New Jersey within ten days of
filing and service of the DRB's report and recommendation.92
The DRB, DEC's and special masters are precluded from acting
upon constitutional challenges." However, the failure of the respondent to raise and properly preserve such issues at the lower
tiers may bar the raising of those issues before the supreme
court.
Following the filing of a report and recommendation for discipline greater than a one-year suspension by the DRB, an order
to show cause issues from the Supreme Court of New Jersey as to
why the respondent should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined. 4 Oral argument on the return date is heard in open
court by the supreme court at the Hughes Justice Complex in
Trenton. The respondent, as at other stages of the process, may
be represented by counsel or appear pro se. The Director or an
OAE staff attorney appears in opposition to the respondent95 and
routinely argues for maximum discipline.
Upon conclusion of oral argument before the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, the court may in its discretion dismiss the
matter, impose discipline, 96 or remand the matter for further
91 Within 10 days after the DRB has filed and served a recommendation for discipline consisting of a one-year suspension or less severe sanction, either the respondent or the OAE may file a motion for leave to file briefs or for oral argument.
N.J. CT. R. 1:20-5(a). Note, however, that mitigating facts should be presented
through testimony and evidence at the DEC hearing, and not first raised by way of
affidavit or brief before the supreme court. In re Hynda, 38 N.J. 94, 95, 183 A.2d 41
(1962).
92 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-5(c)(2).
93 Id. R. 1:20-3(i), 1:20-4(f)(3).
94 The court rules do not specifically provide for this procedure. But see 1987
OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6; Johnson, supra note 29, at 344, col. 1. Regardless
of the severity of the discipline recommended by the DRB, such orders to show
cause routinely require that respondent "show cause why [respondent] should not
be disbarred or otherwise disciplined." 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
95 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-2(b)(4). The OAE represents the public interest at oral argument. Johnson, supra note 29, at 344, col. 2; 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
96 Since the New Jersey Supreme Court's authority to fix appropriate sanctions
in an ethics case is exclusive and tempered only by minimal constitutional constraints and stare decisis, the court can take virtually any action it deems appropriate based upon the circumstances of the matter before it. See, e.g., In re Loring, 73
N.J. 282, 289, 374 A.2d 466, 470 (1972).
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proceedings at the lower tiers.97 If the court decides to impose
public discipline, a written opinion or an order is filed by the
court.9" Generally, where the court affirms and approves the
DRB's recommendation, the court will enter an order which
adopts and incorporates the DRB's recommendation.99 Where
the court finds significant legal or factual issues or disagrees with
the DRB's recommendation, the court will generally file a per
curiam opinion.100 Generally, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
speaks with a unanimous voice with regard to ethics matters.' 0 '
The decisions and orders entered by the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, other than approvals of private reprimands, are matters of public record published in the New Jersey Law Journal
and the New Jersey Reports. Such2 orders become a permanent
0
part of the respondent's record.1

The DRB, at the Director's discretion may hear a matter directly when the disciplinary action is premised upon a criminal
conviction.10 3 In such matters the OAE Director exercises exclusive investigatory and prosecutorial authority,'°4 and the criminal
97 See, e.g., In re Orlando, 104 N.J. 344, 351, 517 A.2d 139, 143 (1986) (remanding case to DRB for development of adequate record and "to make recommendations to this Court on the question of respondent's fitness to practice law").
98 Forms of public discipline include probation, public reprimand, suspensions
and disbarment. 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6. Conditions may also be
imposed such as prohibiting an attorney from engaging in solo practice and requiring that the attorney practice only with supervision. See, e.g., In re Calligy, 99 N.J.
613 (1985) (order requiring supervision by a proctor approved by OAE); In re
Milita, 99 N.J. 336, 345, 492 A.2d 380, 385 (1985) (restoration to practice conditioned on association with another practitioner for two year period).
99 See, e.g., In re Cosgrove, 108 N.J. 684 (1987).
100 See, e.g., In re Skevin, 104 NJ. 476, 477, 517 A.2d 852 (1986). The supreme
court will often quote the DRB's report and recommendation at length. See, e.g., In
re Litwin, 104 N.J. 362, 366-67, 517 A.2d 378, 380-81 (1986); In re Heywood, 98
NJ. 410, 412-20, 486 A.2d 1256, 1257-61 (1985).
101 Even where the supreme court has established new precedent, it has generally
spoken with one voice. E.g., In re Wilson, 81 NJ. 451,409 A.2d 1153 (1979) (establishing doctrine of mandated disbarment where misappropriation is shown). For
examples of cases where dissenting opinions were filed, see In re Rigolosi, 107 NJ.
192, 211, 526 A.2d 670, 682 (1987) (O'Hern,J., dissenting); In re Conway, 107 NJ.
168, 184, 526 A.2d 658, 666 (1987) (O'Hern, J., dissenting); In re Fleischer, 102
NJ. 440, 451, 508 A.2d 1115, 1122 (1986) (O'Hern, J., dissenting); In re Sears, 71
NJ. 175, 202, 364 A.2d 777, 791 (1976) (Sullivan,J., concurring and dissenting); In
re Frankel, 20 NJ. 588, 599, 120 A.2d 603, 609 (1956) (Brennan, J., and Vanderbilt,
CJ., dissenting).
102 E.g., In re Gombar, 103 NJ. 697 (1986).
103 NJ. CT. R. 1:20-6(c)(2)(i). See In re Friedman, 106 N.J. 1, 11-12, 523 A.2d
1071, 1076 (1987). The Director may also proceed in the ordinary course by filing
an ethics complaint. Id.
104 NJ. CT. R. 1:20-6(c)(2). The Director also has exclusive authority where the
respondent is a defendant in a pending criminal matter. Id. R. 1:20-2(b)(l)(ii).
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guilt and

serve[s] to establish the essential facts that sustain the conviction[].' 0 5 However, underlying and collateral facts are consid0 6
ered in assessing the appropriate discipline to be imposed.1
The Supreme Court of New Jersey and the DRB may entertain applications by the OAE for temporary suspension of an attorney "where necessary to protect the interests of an attorney, a
client or the public."''0 7 Where the application is first made to
the DRB, the DRB cannot impose the temporary sanction, but
may only recommend that the supreme court do so.' 0 8 In emergent circumstances, the court will entertain the motion directly. 109 Approximately one-half of these emergent applications
are made directly to the court.
The court's reputation for "swift and severe" discipline is
well deserved; the court has suspended attorneys from practice
on an emergent basis in as little as twenty-four hours." 0 Utilization of the emergent temporary suspension procedure by the Director is gaining in frequency. During a recent one-year period,
attorneys were temporarily suspended through such emergent
applications at the rate of approximately one every two weeks."'
During calendar year 1986, twenty-two attorneys were suspended
in this fashion on an interim basis," 2 and three attorneys
were
13
subjected to less severe interim license restrictions.'
D.

The Expanding Role of the Office of Attorney Ethics

In July 1983, the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced
the creation of the OAE. " 4 The OAE is the successor to the Division of Ethics and Professional Services (DEPS) which evolved
out of the 1978 reorganization and its predecessor known as
105 In re Conway, 107 N.J. 168, 169-70, 526 A.2d 658 (1987) (citations omitted).
See also N.J. CT. R. 1:20-6(c)(2)(ii).
106 In re Conway, 107 NJ. 168, 526 A.2d 658 (citing N.J. CT. R. 1:20-6(c)(1)). See
also In re Infinito, 94 N.J. 50, 57, 462 A.2d 160, 163-64 (1983); In re Hughes, 90 N.J.
32, 36, 446 A.2d 1208, 1210 (1982); In re Rosen, 88 N.J. 1, 3, 438 A.2d 316, 317
(1981).
4
107 N.J. CT. R. 1:20- (g). The Director exercises exclusive authority to prosecute
such applications. Id. R. 1:20-2(b)(1)(i).
108 Id. R. 1:20-4(g).
109 Id. R. 1:20-5(b).
110 Johnson, supra note 2, at 505 n. 283. Such applications made first to the DRB
take approximately two weeks to one month. Id.
I I Id. at 505.
112 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 14.
113 Id.
114 See supra note 15.
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Central Ethics, which had been established in the Administrative
Office of the Courts in 1973.115 The OAE began operations in
October 1983.116

The court endowed the OAE and its Director with supervisory, financial, administrative, managerial and advisory responsibilities as well as exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute complex ethics cases and matters where a lawyer is a
defendant in a criminal proceeding.' 17 As mentioned earlier, the
OAE also has power to take emergent action as it deems necessary to protect the public by moving before the Supreme Court
of New Jersey or the DRB for interim suspensions or imposition
of other license restrictions."" Additionally, the OAE manages
the fee arbitration committees, 19 the Random Audit Compliance
Program"' 0 and the Trust Account Overdraft Notification Program. 12 1 The latter two programs are aimed at detecting financial transgressions.
When argument is heard by the supreme court on motions
for interim sanctions, for final discipline or with regard to interlocutory matters and constitutional challenges, an OAE staff
at121
prosecutor.
of
role
the
in
appears
Director
the
torney or
The OAE is primarily viewed as the prosecutorial arm of the
court, and the power delegated to the OAE is concentrated in its
Director. The Director's powers and duties include: (1) employment and retention of DEC secretaries and making recommendations regarding their compensation; 123 (2) recommending
members of the Bar to serve on the DEC's; 12 4 (3) reassigning
cases from one DEC to another; 1 5 and (4) recommending rules
and regulations governing procedures before the DEC's and with
regard to ethics matters generally. 126 While administrative and
115 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 12.
117 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-2(b)(1)-(16).
118 See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
119 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-2(b)(8).
120 Id. R. 1:20-2(b)(9), 1:21-6(c). For discussion of the Random Audit Compliance Program authorized by the Director, see Johnson, Random Audit Compliance Program, NEWJERSEY LAWYER, Spring 1986, at 12; 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at
115-29.
121 N.J. CT. R. 1:21-6(a)(2). For a discussion of the program by the Director, see
1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 130-37.
122 See supra note 95.
123 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-2(b)(11).
124 Id. R. 1:20-2(b)(12).
125 Id. R. 1:20-2(b)(6).
126 Id. R. 1:20-2(b)(14). While court rules governing most other areas of practice
116
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financial support services for the OAE are derived through the
Administrative Office of the Courts,12 the
Director reports solely to
7
the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

This concentration of functions and delegation of responsibilities makes the office of the OAE Director the epicenter of ethics enforcement activities. The power wielded by the Director
makes him a strong force on a statewide front, and that influence
particularly permeates the lowest tier, the DEC's.
OAE staff counsel are involved in overseeing and monitoring
the DEC's. 128 The Director and OAE staff attorneys consult with
and advise the DEC's with regard to procedural and legal matters
and attend DEC meetings.129 This close contact and controlling
influence fosters greater uniformity of enforcement and application of ethics rules and precedents. However, the legal advice
given by the Director, the chief ethics prosecutor, to the DEC's,
the primary adjudicative tribunals, may influence the outcome in
a given case.' 3 0 Neither the respondent nor counsel for the reare recommended and drafted by committees appointed by the court consisting of
jurists and practitioners, the OAE Director alone enjoys this rule-drafting function
in the ethics realm. Query: whether a committee composed of the Director, the
DRB Counsel and ethics practitioners would be better able to draft fair and evenhanded rules? For an example of the prosecutorial slant with which these rules are
drafted see supra note 181.
127 Id. R. 1:20-2(a); see Supreme Court Announces New Office of Attorney Ethics, 112
N.J.L.J. 93 (1983).
128 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 17.
129 Id. The court rules do not specifically authorize the OAE or its Director to
render legal or procedural advice to the DEC's. Rule 1:20-2(b)(8) authorizes advisement only of the "Fee Committees." N.J. CT. R. 1:20-2(b)(8).
130 Following action by the court on matters that are initiated by the OAE on
applications seeking interim suspension, such matters are assigned to a DEC for
plenary review. See, e.g., In re Fleischer, 102 N.J. 440, 442-43, 508 A.2d 1115, 111617 (1986) (DRB report and recommendation recounts the procedural history of the
matter, which was commenced by the filing of a notice of motion for temporary
suspension; in this case, the motion was denied, a complaint was filed by the OAE
and the matter was subsequently heard by a DEC hearing panel). In such cases, the
file compiled by the OAE is transmitted to the secretary of the DEC assigned to
hear the matter. It has been the experience of the author that transmittal correspondence from the Director or his staff will state in conclusory fashion that the
respondent in question has committed particular acts of misconduct. While such
statements may appear in correspondence to the respective DEC secretary, such
correspondence typically becomes part of the DEC file that is reviewed by the preliminary investigator and by the DEC hearing panel. Conclusory statements of
guilt coming from the chief ethics enforcement officer can unfairly influence the
actions and recommendations of the hearing panel. Such ex parte communications
between an interested party and a judge in a civil or criminal case would ordinarily
be considered inappropriate. N.J. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 3 & comment;
N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.5(b), 8.4(d), (f). However, under
current disciplinary practice, the ethics prosecutors, the Director and OAE staff at-
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spondent should lose sight of the potential impact of the OAE
Director's influence, particularly in cases commenced by emergent application on the OAE's initiative.
III.

THE PITFALLS FROM THE RESPONDENT'S PERSPECTIVE

In a recent commentary appearing in the NewJersey Law Journal entitled "What Every Lawyer Needs To Know About Ethics,"
OAE Director David E. Johnson, Jr., analogized ethics proceedings to complaints raised with Better Business Bureaus by dissatisfied consumers. 1 3 ' The Director stated:
The first thing that every lawyer needs to do is to realize
that ethics grievances are a normal risk of doing business....
Grievances can be expected to occur and attorneys must be
prepared to deal with them, either before they happen by anticipating the ethical issues, or after they happen by dealing
32
effectively with them through the disciplinary process.'
While neither commercial retailers nor lawyers can expect to make
each. and every customer or client perfectly happy, the similarities

end there. Ordinarily, recalcitrant retailers may be subject to a fine,
required to pay damages or ordered to cease unfair business practices. Blameworthy attorneys, however, often suffer severe consequences to their reputations and careers, and may be publicly
censured, suspended from practice or permanently barred from
practicing their chosen profession.
The Director, in his aforementioned commentary, correctly
torneys, regularly advise the DEC's on legal and procedural matters. 1987 OAE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 17. While rule 1:20-2(b)(8) specifically authorizes the
Director to render legal and administrative advice to "the Fee Committees in accordance with Rule 1:20A-1 et seq.," the court rules do not specifically authorize
the Director or his staff to render such advice to the DEC's. Interaction between
the DEC's and the Director or OAE is, however, required under various provisions
of the rules. See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(c). While it has been held constitutionally permissible for the court, through its agents, to act as complainant, investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury, the court has recognized the need for separation of the
investigative and prosecutorial functions from the deliberative fact-finding function. In re Logan, 71 N.J. 583, 586, 367 A.2d 419, 421 (1976). See also Gipson v.
New Jersey Supreme Court, 416 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (D.N.J. 1976), aft'd, 558 F.2d
701 (3d Cir. 1977). Query: whether the OAE's present practice of advising the
DEC's on particular cases is appropriate? Advisement of the DEC's on procedural
and legal matters would be less suspect if provided by DRB counsel, who is responsible for providing similar advice to the DRB. See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-4(b)(1). Similarly, the DisTRICT ETHics COMMrIrEE MANUAL currently prepared and distributed
by the OAE should be the responsibility of the DRB Counsel.
131 Johnson, supra note 29, at 343, col. 3. For a recent article, seeJohnson, Under-

standing Ethics Grievances, NEW JERSEY
132

LAWYER,

Johnson, supra note 29, at 343, col. 3.

Spring 1987.
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cautions that, "the first step in dealing with the concept of a grievance is to recognize one's own vulnerability."' 1 3 3 Once a grievance
has been filed, the respondent must be properly apprised of his or
her rights and obligations under the applicable court rules, the
Rules of Professional Conduct and case precedent. Important factors which respondent should consider include: (a) the nature and
scope of disciplinary proceedings; (b) the standard of proof; (c) the
extent to which the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked; and (d) the extent to which discovery may be obtained.
These important issues and others are discussed below.
A.

Proceedings of the "Third Kind"

Over a century ago, in Ex Parte Wall,' 3 4 the United States
Supreme Court characterized disciplinary proceedings as "civil"
in nature. 13 5 More recently, in In re Ruffalo, 13 6 the United States
Supreme Court characterized disciplinary proceedings for disbarment as "adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature."' 1 37 The majority of lawyers exposed to the process as
either respondents or ethics defense counsel would probably
agree with the latter characterization, particularly in light of the
potentially devastating consequences to the accused attorney.
The Supreme Court of NewJersey, however, has rejected both of
these characterizations, and has consistently used the term "sui
generis 9 13 8 to place disciplinary proceedings in a class by themselves. 139 A majority of jurisdictions agree that disciplinary pro133

Id.

134 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
1'5 Id. at 288.

390 U.S. 544, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968).
Id. at 551.
The term "sui generis" means "of its own kind or class; i.e., the only one of its
kind; peculiar." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1286 (5th ed. 1979).
139 See In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 227, 358 A.2d 787, 790, reh'g granted, 71 N.J. 583,
367 A.2d 419 (1976); In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 419, 177 A.2d 721, 730 (1962);
Taft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 285, 113 A.2d 671, 674 (1955); In re Ries, 131 N.J.L.
559, 562, 37 A.2d 417, 419 (Sup. Ct. 1944). Subsequent to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in In re Ruffalo, one commentator suggested that the sui
generis label was no longer valid. See Haines, supra note 4, at 26, cols. 1-2. Thereafter, however, the opinion rendered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Logan,
made no reference to In re Ruffalo and, relying on its earlier decision in In re Ries,
the court stated: "The respondent contends that the disciplinary proceeding is
equivalent to a criminal proceeding. But it is not. It is sui generis." In re Logan, 70
N.J. at 227, 358 A.2d at 790. But cf. In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32, 42, 446 A.2d 1208,
1213-14 (1982) (Schreiber, J., dissenting) (citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550
reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968)) ("Yet we must not forget that disbarment is a
punishment and its effect can be devastating.").
136
137
138
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ceedings are of their "own kind," being neither civil nor criminal
40

in nature. 1
The continued characterization of ethics proceedings as sui
generis by the New Jersey Supreme Court, notwithstanding the
contrary labelling applied by the United States Supreme Court in
Ruffalo, has limited the procedural safeguards afforded respondents. In proceedings characterized as quasi-criminal in nature,
such as enforcement proceedings involving zoning ordinance violations or health code offenses, the accused is afforded procedural safeguards ordinarily due those charged with felonious
conduct. 14 1 Comparison of the applicable burdens of proof is illustrative in this regard. In a zoning ordinance enforcement matter, the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as in criminal
cases. 142 In disciplinary matters, however, the burden is proof by
clear and convincing evidence. 143 In In re Pennica,1 44 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey announced the rule, stating:
[Tihe quantum of proof required to warrant discipline or disbarment is different from that demanded for conviction of a
criminal charge....

Because of the dire consequences which

may flow from an adverse finding, however, we regard as necessary to sustain such a finding the production of a greater
quantum of proof than is ordinarily required in a civil action,
i.e., a preponderance of the evidence, but less than that called
for to sustain a criminal conviction, i.e., proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Although the specific rule has not been articulated previously in this State, we declare it to be that discipline or disbarment is warranted only where the evidence of
unethical conduct or unfitness to continue
in practice against
45
an attorney is clear and convincing.'
140 See LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 101:2101-2103
(1984) [hereinafter LAWYER'S MANUAL]. While a majority ofjurisdictions characterize disciplinary proceedings as neither civil nor criminal, characterizations which
have been applied by the minority include civil, criminal, quasi-civil, quasi-criminal
and quasi-judicial. Nordby, The Burdened Privilege: Defending Lawyers in Disciplinary
Proceedings, 30 S.C.L. REV. 363, 378-79, nn.83-89 (1979).
141 See Town of Belleville v. Parrillo's, Inc., 83 N.J. 309, 312, 416 A.2d 388, 389
(1980); State v. Weir, 183 N.J. Super. 237, 242, 443 A.2d 773, 776 (App. Div. 1982)
(all involving zoning ordinances); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-34 (1967) (juvenile delinquency proceeding).
142 See supra note 141.
143 In re Gross, 67 N.J. 419, 341 A.2d 336 (1975); In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401,419,
177 A.2d 721, 730 (1962).
144 36 N.J. 401, 177 A.2d 721 (1962).
145 Id. at 419, 177 A.2d at 730 (citations omitted); see also In re Shaw, 88 N.J. 433,
435, 437, 443 A.2d 670, 671 (1982) (quality of evidence must be clear and convincing). Other jurisdictions have applied other standards. See, e.g., Cushway v. State
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The burden of proof in proceedings seeking imposition of discipline is ordinarily on ethics counsel or the presenter.' 4 6 However,
there is no articulated presumption of innocence as afforded in
criminal or quasi-criminal matters. Due to the duty of cooperation
and candor placed upon respondents by the Rules of Professional
Conduct,' 4 7 the failure to adequately explain one's conduct can lead
to discipline.' 4 8
In addition to application of a less stringent standard of proof,
the characterization of disciplinary proceedings as something less
burdensome than quasi-criminal has additional ramifications. While
statutes of limitation generally apply in criminal and civil matters,
there is no time limitation on disciplinary matters. 4 9 However,
where transgressions are remote in time, less severe discipline has
50
been deemed appropriate.
Although the United States Supreme Court held in Ruffalo that
a lawyer 'is entitled to fair notice of the charges against him, 15 ' the
sufficiency of such notice is judged by a lower standard than that
52
applied in criminal and quasi-criminal matters.
Furthermore, in criminal and quasi-criminal matters, a defendant can be held accountable only when a specifically articulated law
has been clearly violated. The NewJersey Supreme Court stated, in
Bar of Georgia, 120 Ga. App. 371, 170 S.E.2d 732 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 910
(1970) (beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Shigon, 462 Pa. 1, 18, 329 A.2d 235, 243
(1974) (clear and satisfactory); In re Capoccia, 59 N.Y.2d 549, 549-50, 466 N.Y.S.2d
268, 268-69, 453 N.E.2d 497, 497-98 (1983) (preponderance of the evidence). Cf.
In re Hecker, 109 NJ. 539 (1988) (civil verdict relied upon to establish amount of
fees overcharged by respondent notwithstanding lower standard of proof). For
survey of jurisdictions, see LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 140, at 101:2103-04. For
discussion of other standards, see Nordby, supra note 140, at 391-92.
146 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11 (g). By implication, respondent has the burden of proof by
clear and convincing evidence with respect to affirmative defenses, claims of mental
or physical disability and as to circumstances of mitigation. See id. R. 1:20-3(i). In
license restoration proceedings, the burden is on respondent. Id. R. 1:20-11 (g).
147 N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1.
148 See infra notes 176-97 and accompanying text (for discussion of duty to cooperate and adverse effect of failure to do so).
149 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11(f).
150 E.g., In re Kotok, 108 N.J. 314, 330, 528 A.2d 1307, 1315 (1987) (ten years
after admission to the bar, attorney placed on probation for false or misleading
statement made on bar admission application).
151 See In re Fleischer, 102 N.J. 440, 452, 508 A.2d 1115, 1122 (1986) (O'Hern, J.,
dissenting) (With regard to deletion of stipulations of fact at commencement of
DEC hearing, Justice O'Hern, citing to Ruffalo, stated that, "Lawyers are entitled to
no less fundamental procedural fairness than others facing disciplinary action.").
Id. (citation omitted).
152 LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 140, at 101:2201-02.
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In re Cipriano,15 1 that absence of a specific rule of proscription is not
a defense in an ethics matter: "Respondent claims that he may not
be disciplined because no Disciplinary Rule proscribing the specific
conduct has been violated. We have previously commented that
'[t]his Court's disciplinary power is not confined to the area covered
by the canons.' ",154 The supreme court, however, has not applied
case precedent retrospectively where no uniform treatment had
15 5
been previously given in similar circumstances.
In Ruffalo, the United States Supreme Court held that procedural due process requires that an attorney receive fair notice of the
charges and the intended reach of the proceedings.15 6 In New
Jersey, the court rules require that a formal complaint be filed setting forth "the facts constituting the alleged improper conduct...
' 57
and the ethical rules asserted to have been violated.'
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Ruffalo, the Supreme Court of NewJersey considered a respondent's
argument that the failure to specify the canon of ethics alleged to
have been violated deprived him of the opportunity to prepare a
defense in In re Kamp. 15 The court stated that, "if at any time the
facts disclosed that additional canons may have been violated, ordi153

68 N.J. 398, 346 A.2d 393 (1975).

154 Id. at 402, 346 A.2d at 395 (citation omitted). Cf.State v. P.T. & L. Constr.

Co., 77 N.J. 20, 31, 389 A.2d 448, 453-54 (1978) (since zoning charge is considered
penal in nature, conviction cannot stand unless ordinance clearly prohibits complained of conduct).
155 In re Hollandonner, 102 N.J. 21, 28-29, 504 A.2d 1174, 1179 (1985) (case
precedent not applied retrospectively where court has addressed for first time
"near identity of escrow funds and trust funds"); In re Strickland, 87 N.J. 575, 578,
436 A.2d 1337, 1338-39 (1981) (supreme court rejected DRB recommendation
based upon retrospective rather than prospective application of ethics case precedent); In re Smock, 86 N.J. 426, 427-28, 432 A.2d 34, 35 (1981) (supreme court
noted retrospective application does not serve appropriate deterrent purpose); In
re Cohn, 46 N.J. 202, 214-15, 216 A.2d 1, 8 (1966) (respondent acquitted where
conduct in question was customary practice among the bar, but discontinued by
respondent upon issuance of advisory opinion). See also In re Leahy, 111 N.J. 127,
128, 543 A.2d 439, 440 (1988) ("[R]espondent's conduct is measured against the
Disciplinary Rules in effect at the time of the misconduct.").
156 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968).
157 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(h). Under the current rules, prior to the filing of the complaint, the respondent is ordinarily provided with a copy of the grievance, his or her
comments are solicited by the investigator and a copy of the investigative report is
provided. Id. R. 1:20-3(f). Under the rules as they existed in 1976, respondents did
not participate at the investigative stage and often were not even made aware of the
grievance at the preliminary stages. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
procedure did not violate respondent's due process rights so long as access to information uncovered by the investigation was provided after formal proceedings
were instituted. In re Logan, 70 N.J. 222, 229, 358 A.2d 787, 791 (1976).
158 40 N.J. 588, 598-99, 194 A.2d 236, 242 (1963).
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narily the new charges should be formalized with full opportunity
afforded [respondent] to meet them." '5 9 The court held that the
complaint clearly presented the issue of a conflict of interest and the
applicable canon need not have been charged. 60 Based upon respondent Kamp's own admissions during the hearing of his case, the
court found that he had violated two additional canons involving
issues not considered by the County Ethics Committee and not
raised in the complaint.' 6' The court did not consider these additional violations, however, recognizing that respondent had been af62
forded no notice or opportunity to meet them.
While the result reached by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in Kamp is consistent with the subsequent decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Ruffalo, the rationale is not. In Ruffalo the
Court stated:
The charge must be known before the proceedings commence. They become a trap when, after they are underway,
the charges are amended on the basis of testimony of the accused. He can then be given no opportunity
to expunge the
63
earlier statements and start afresh.1
The state supreme court's statements in Kamp would seem to allow
amendment at the discretion of the court, the DRB or DEC,
although in that case the court did not remand the matter for further proceedings on the additional charges, but instead ignored
them in imposing discipline. Unfortunately, the New Jersey court
rules do not specifically address the issue. 164
Paradoxically, while describing ethics proceedings as more civil
159 Id. at 599, 194 A.2d at 242.
160 Then applicable court rule 1:16-4(a) did not require the recitation of the ethics rules at issue as does the current rule 1:20-3(h). For a discussion of the current
rule, see supra note 157.
161 Kamp, 40 N.J. at 597-99, 194 A.2d at 241-42.
162 Id. at 599, 194 A.2d at 242.
163 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (footnote omitted); see also In re Fleisher, 102 N.J
440, 452-53, 508 A.2d 1115, 1123 (1986) (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (noting respondents did not realize they were in "mortal danger" and subject to charges of
"knowing misappropriation" where exculpatory stipulation of fact was unexpectedly deleted on insistence of DEC panel at opening of hearing and three respondents were subsequently found guilty of misappropriation and disbarred based
principally upon their own admissions made during their DEC hearing).
164 Court rule 1:20-3(h) requires that a formal written complaint "shall" be filed
setting forth the relevant facts and ethics rules. See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(h). Rule
1:20-3(i) mandates that respondent "shall" set forth affirmative defenses, including
claims of mental and physical disability in his or her answer. NJ. CT. R. 1:20-3(i).
Respondent "may" also set forth mitigating circumstances. Id. The rules do not
address amendment of either the complaint or the answer. See also infra note 181
and accompanying text.
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in nature than criminal, 16 5 the Supreme Court of New Jersey has
nonetheless used the same type of approach in determining the discipline to be imposed in certain ethics proceedings as is used in
criminal proceedings,' 6 6 and the court has referred to a disciplinary
sanction as a "penalty." '6 7 Thus, the sui generis label seems to engender rather than eliminate confusion for both the bar and the
bench.
B.

Self-Incrimination vs. Duty of Candor and Cooperation

The privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth
amendment as applied to the several states through the fourteenth amendment does not exclude lawyers.16 8 In Spevack v.
Klein,' 69 the United States Supreme Court held that an attorney
cannot be disbarred solely for properly invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination during a disciplinary proceeding. 170 In
Spevack, the Supreme Court further stated:
The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional
standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege. That threat is indeed as powerful an instrument of
compulsion as "the use of legal process to force from the lips
of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict
him".... We find no room in the privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people so as to deny it to some
and extend it to others. Lawyers are not excepted from the
words 'No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself'; and we can imply no
excep71
tion. . . . [L]awyers also enjoy first class citizenship.'
Thus, the privilege applies to lawyers no less than to other citizens.
The sui generis labelling of ethics proceedings in New Jersey, however, and the concomitant application of lesser due process standards, result in the privilege apparently being unavailable where the
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
E.g., In re Infinito, 94 NJ. 50, 57, 462 A.2d 160, 163 (1983). The court stated:
Our goal in these hearings is to protect the interests of the public
and the bar while giving due consideration to the interests of the individual involved. Similar to a sentencing judge in a criminal matter, we
take into consideration many factors in determining the proper discipline to be imposed.
Id. (citations omitted).
165
166

167
168

Id.
See U.S.

CONST.

amend. V, XIV.

385 U.S. 511 (1967).
Id. at 514-16 (overruling Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1956)).
171 Id. at 516.
169
170

1988]

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

581

compelled disclosures would lead only to disbarment or other less
17 2
severe discipline.
In civil matters, an adverse inference may be drawn from a
party's failure or refusal to take the stand without offending the
privilege against self-incrimination. In Duratron Corporationv. Republic Stuyvesant Corporation,173 the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey distinguished Spevack as involving the actual
consequence of disbarment, while stating that the defendant in
Duratron risked only a money judgment. 17 4 The decision of the
court in Duratron, however, does not address the extent to which
adverse inferences may be drawn where the privilege is invoked in
disciplinary proceedings, and the New Jersey Supreme Court has
not directly addressed the question. Nevertheless, it appears that
the privilege cannot be invoked when the disclosures sought can
lead only to imposition of discipline in sui generis ethics
5
proceedings. 17
The Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, place further burdens on respondents in ethics proceedings. Attorneys are duty-bound under the Rules of Professional Conduct to voluntarily disclose relevant information in
ethics proceedings commenced against them. 1 7 6 In at least one jurisdiction, a lawyer has been found in violation of this duty by failing
177
to report his own misconduct.
172 For an in-depth discussion of Spevack, see Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity, and Comment in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 MICH. L. REV. 84 (1973). See
also, Nordby, supra note 140, at 386-87, nn. 132-41.
173 95 N.J. Super. 527, 231 A.2d 854 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 50 N.J. 404, 235
A.2d 897 (1967).
174 Id. at 533, 231 A.2d 854, 857.
175 Other jurisdictions have concluded that if the information sought could not
subject the lawyer to criminal prosecution, the privilege is not invocable even
though the information implicates the lawyer in ethics violations. See, e.g., Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d 430, 438-39, 231 N.E.2d 718, 721, 285 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6,
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 925 (1967). For discussion of cases in other jurisdictions, see
LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 140, at 101:2402-04.
176 Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in part:
[A] lawyer... in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension
known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to
respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by RPC 1.6 [attorney-client privilege].
N.J. RuLs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (b).
177 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Casety, 511 Pa. 177, 512 A.2d 607 (1986).
See also Note, supra note 172, at 115-17. But see N.J. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 8.3. Court rule 1:20-7(a) requires attorneys to report to the Director
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In criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, the state court
rules require the accused to disclose only the existence of an alibi
defense.'
The criminal defendant need not provide any further
information, and comment or inference based upon defendant's silence or nondisclosure is precluded.1 79 Even where the defendant
fails to comply with the alibi notice requirements, no adverse comment or inference may attach.' 8 0 In New Jersey ethics proceedings,
however, the court rules require that the respondent file an answer
to an ethics complaint. 8 1 Failure to file an answer itself is cause for
discipline, and may be considered as an aggravating factor in determining the severity of discipline to be imposed. 8 2 Candor and cooperation are mandatory as to both exculpatory and inculpatory
information. 8 3 Thus, an attorney can be compelled to give testiand the court any disciplinary action taken against them in other jurisdictions. NJ.
CT. R. 1:20-7(a). Under rule revisions proposed by the OAE and recently adopted
by the supreme court effective January 2, 1989, attorneys are now required to also
report the filing of any criminal charges in any jurisdiction. See NJ. CT. R. 1:206(a); see also New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics, 1988 Office of Attorney Ethics Proposed Rules Changes with Commentary, reprinted in 112 N.J.LJ. 98, 125, col. 1 (1988)
[hereinafter 1988 Proposed Rules].
178 N.J. CT. R. 3:11-1. Failure to give notice setting forth the required particulars
may result in exclusion of alibi witnesses or limitation of the use of the alibi defense. Id. R. 3:11-2.
179 See e.g., State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 358 A.2d 163 (1976) (doctrine of "assenting silence" no longer viable as far as silence of criminal defendant is
concerned).
180 E.g., State v. Aceta, 223 N.J. 21, 29, 537 A.2d 1317, 1322 (App. Div. 1988).
181 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(i) (stating "respondent shall file a verified answer") (emphasis added). In In re Gavel, 22 NJ. 249, 125 A.2d 696 (1956), the court observed
that the respondent's answer should include a "full, candid and complete disclosure of all facts reasonably within the scope of... the charges against him." Id. at
263, 125 A.2d at 704. The rules have been amended effective January 2, 1989, to
include language mirroring the court's above-quoted pronouncement in Gavel. See
1988 Pposed Rules, supra note 177, at 124, col. 2. More troubling is the supreme
court's adoption of the OAE's proposal that the respondent be required to file a
"verified" answer so that the respondent can be impeached by his own responsive
pleading. Id. at 98, col. 2. See also In re Kern, 68 N.J. 325, 326, 345 A.2d 321, 322
(1975); OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 16 (extension of 10 day period to file answer may be granted by a DEC only upon showing of "extraordinary
good cause"). Query: whether a respondent should be required to file a verified
answer within 10 days where respondent may not have knowledge of the facts? In
cases involving charges of financial transgressions, an investigation or audit by respondent's accountant may be necessary in order to determine the facts. Such endeavors often take weeks to complete even when all records are readily available. Is
it fair to place such a burden on the accused attorney?
182 E.g., In re Smith, 101 N.J. 568, 572-73, 503 A.2d 846, 848 (1986). See also N.J.
CT. R. 1:20-3(i); N.J. RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1(b).
183 In re Winberry, 101 N.J. 557, 566-67, 503 A.2d 306, 311 (1986) (attorney has
duty to be candid and to cooperate with courts and ethics tribunals). See In re Goer,
100 N.J. 529, 536, 497 A.2d 1255, 1258 (1985) (attorney's professional misconduct
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mony which would demonstrate his unfitness to practice law as long
as the compelled testimony will not expose the attorney to criminal
prosecution.
A respondent and counsel may, thus, find themselves in a strategical quandary; i.e., whether to assert the privilege against self-incrimination and risk enhanced disciplinary sanctions due to lack of
candor and non-cooperation, or to risk criminal prosecution in an
84
attempt to mitigate against harsh ethics discipline.
In State v. Stroger,' 8 5 the New Jersey Supreme Court considered
the interplay between disclosure required under the ethics rules and
the defendant-respondent's fifth amendment rights. In Stroger, upon
the demand of DEPS, the defendant-respondent was required to
produce during the course of an ethics investigation, financial
records of the type required to be maintained under New Jersey
Court Rule 1:21-6.86 Following the turnover of those records to
DEPS, they were disclosed to the prosecutor's office by DEPS at the
request of the prosecutor. Stroger argued for suppression of the
records and documents
before the criminal trial court, and the mo8 7
tion was denied.
extended to his failure to cooperate in ethics proceedings); In re Haft, 98 N.J. 1, 8,
483 A.2d 393, 396 (1984) (attorney's failure to respond to inquiries as well as his
lack of respect for the court "adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law"). See
also In re Kotok, 108 N.J. 314, 329, 528 A.2d 1307, 1315 (1987) (attorney placed on
probation for one year for, among other things, false statements on bar admission
application ten years earlier).
184 Court rule 1:20-11 provides that ethics proceedings may be held in abeyance
pending completion of civil or criminal litigation where the same questions of law
and fact are involved. See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11. However, such a stay is at the discretion of the DEC, special master, DRB or the court, respectively. OAE Guideline
No. 9 specifically provides for the stay of ethics proceedings where the respondent
is a party or trial counsel in underlying civil proceedings. Where the respondent is
the subject of an ongoing criminal matter, discretion to prosecute a related ethics
violation rests with the Director. N.J. CT. R. 1:20-6(c)(2) & l:20-2(b)(1)(ii). County
prosecutors and other chief law enforcement officials are requested to notify the
Director of any indictments returned or criminal charges filed against attorneys. See
OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 19. Whenever temporary or final
discipline has been imposed and "there is evidence of criminal conduct," the Director may refer the matter and the ethics file to the appropriate law enforcement
authorities upon 10 days notice to the respondent. N.J. CT. R. 1:20-10(d). The
DRB may authorize such disclosure even in the absence of the imposition of ethics
discipline. Id. See also State v. Stroger, 185 NJ. Super. 124, 447 A.2d 598 (Law Div.
1981), aff'd, 97 N.J. 391, 478 A.2d 1175 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985).
185 185 NJ. Super. 124, 447 A.2d 598 (Law Div. 1981), aft'd, 97 NJ. 391, 478
A.2d 1175 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985).
186 All attorneys practicing in New Jersey are required to maintain, among other
things, a business account and a trust account together with records, ledgers and
documents necessary for proper accounting thereof. See N.J. CT. R. 1:21-6.
187 Stroger, 185 N.J. Super. at 136, 447 A.2d at 604. In addition to the fifth

584

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 18:554

The defendant-respondent contended that DEPS' demand for
the production and turnover of his financial records based upon the
mandate of New Jersey Court Rule 1:21-6188 "was tantamount to
giving him the choice between producing incriminating documents,
and thereby 'waiving' his fifth-amendment rights, and being subject
to disciplinary action." 189 The New Jersey Supreme Court distinguished Spevack 190 on the basis that the records demanded there
may not have been required to be kept by the attorney.' ' The
supreme court concluded that records required to be kept under the
rule "are not at all of a testimonial or a compelled nature when they
are prepared so as to, and in fact do, speak for themselves," without
19 2
requiring the attorney to restate, repeat or affirm their contents.
It is interesting to note further that testimony given under grant
of immunity in a criminal matter may be used in subsequent disciplinary proceedings.'
Moreover, while a criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of the commission of the crime in subsequent
ethics proceedings,' 9 4 an acquittal after a criminal trial is not res
judicata in a subsequent disciplinary action. 95 This result is premised on the sui generis characterization and lower burden of proof
that flows therefrom. The question of whether a civil acquittal
would collaterally estop relitigation of the same issues in a subseamendment argument, respondent Stroger asserted that a search and seizure had
occurred in violation of his fourth amendment rights, but both the trial court and
supreme court concluded that no search or seizure had occurred because respondent knew or should have known that the financial records were subject to examination. Id. See also N.J. CT. R. 1:21-6(c), (g).
188 This rule provides:
An attorney who fails to comply with the requirements of this rule in
respect of the maintenance, availability and preservation of accounts
and records or who fails to produce such records as required shall be
deemed to be in violation of RPC 1.15(d).
N.J. CT. R. 1:21-6(h).
189 Stroger, 97 NJ. at 407, 478 A.2d at 1183.
190 See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
191 Stroger, at 407, 478 A.2d at 1183.
192 Id. at 405, 478 A.2d at 1182.
193 See LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 140, at 101:2403-04 (citations omitted);
Nordby, supra note 140, at 387; Note, supra note 172, at 108-12.
'94 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-6(c)(1) & (b)(2)(ii). See In re Coruzzi, 98 N.J. 77, 80, 484 A.2d
667, 668 (1984) ("conviction of an attorney conclusively established the underlying
facts in disciplinary proceedings") (citations omitted).
195 In re Rigolosi, 107 N.J. 192, 206, 526 A.2d 670, 679 (1987) (citing In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 418, 177 A.2d 721, 730 (1962)). In Rigolosi, Justice O'Hern, dissenting, stated that ajury's verdict of acquittal should not be impeached where "the
central issue of ethical failure is so closely intertwined with the jury's finding of
innocence on a single, crucial factual issue." Id. at 212, 526 A.2d at 682 (O'Hern,
J., dissenting).
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quent ethics proceeding has not as yet been judicially addressed. 196
The application of collateral estoppel and res judicata to such successive proceedings would be consistent with the applicable rules
and guidelines.' 9 7 Moreover, it would be unfair to disregard a civil
verdict of acquittal where the questions of fact determined therein
are the gravamen of the ethics charge. Requiring respondent to relitigate those facts and issues after going through the time and expense of a civil trial would be contrary to notions of fundamental
fairness as well as judicial economy.
C.

Confrontation of Witnesses and Discovery

Respondents who are unfamiliar with the rules governing
disciplinary proceedings often focus their efforts toward satisfying and ameliorating the grievant rather than giving their full attention to responding to the grievance. Such attorneys labor
under the misconception that "settling" the matter with the
grievant will automatically dispose of the grievance. While reconciliation and client satisfaction are laudatory goals, the grievance itself must be addressed, not merely the aggrieved.
Although a grievant may decide to withdraw his or her grievance because the attorney has since satisfied the complaint or the
grievant has simply lost interest in pursuing the matter, the court
rules preclude the abandonment of grievances except by leave
granted by the DEC "upon good cause shown." 9 8 Absent good
cause, the OAE is substituted as the party grievant, and the matter otherwise proceeds in the ordinary course. 99 The grievant
196 Since the clear and convincing burden of proof applicable in ethics proceedings is higher than the preponderance of evidence standard applied in civil cases, a
non-suit or favorable verdict in a civil malpractice action should bar relitigation of
the same issues of fact or law in a subsequent disciplinary action. See In re Hecker,
109 N.J. 539, 538 A.2d 354 (1988) (civil verdict relied upon by special master to
establish amount of fees overcharged by respondent notwithstanding lower standard of proof in civil trial).
197 See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11 (d); see also OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline
No. 9 (providing for deferral of ethics proceedings pending completion of criminal
or civil proceedings "involving the same parties and the same questions of law and
fact").
198 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11 (e). See also In re Stout, 75 N.J. 321, 323, 382 A.2d 630, 631
(1978) (grievant sought withdrawal upon restitution of misappropriated funds); In
re Rosenblatt, 60 N.J. 505, 508 n.2, 291 A.2d 369, 371 n.2 (1972) (respondent's
securing of written grievance withdrawal document of no effect); In re Rogovoy, 30
N.J. 1, 5, 152 A.2d 1, 3 (1959) (supreme court announced policy against withdrawal). Where the grievant's testimony is deemed necessary, it can be compelled
by subpoena. N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(o); OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No.
14. See also In re Katz, 90 N.J. 272, 281 n.3, 447 A.2d 916, 920 n.3 (1982).
199 NJ. CT. R. 1:20-11(e).
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need not appear at the hearing,2"' and even anonymous complaints are acted upon where sufficient documentary evidence is
available to the DEC.2"' Interestingly, since jurisdiction is based
upon authorized practice of law in New Jersey rather than physical presence, it would appear that a respondent's absence or disappearance does not necessarily bar the continuation of ethics
proceedings. 20

2

Thus, unlike criminal and quasi-criminal pro-

ceedings, neither the complaining grievant nor the accused respondent need be present for an ethics matter to proceed.
Hearings conducted before DEC panels are formal and private, but the rules of evidence are not strictly applied.203 Witnesses may be subpoenaed and called by the presenter and the
respondent. 201 The grievant and the respondent, and their re-

spective counsel, if any, have the right to be present.20 5 However, contrary to prior practice, the grievant's counsel may not
serve as the presenter to prosecute the matter before the DEC
panel.20 6
Discovery is available to the respondent on a limited basis.
First, respondent must set forth a demand for discovery in respondent's answer to the complaint.20 7 Absent such a demand,
discovery is deemed waived.208 If respondent requests discovery,
reciprocal discovery is automatically required.20 9 If not, the DEC
may request discovery within ten days of the due date of respondent's answer.210 Once requested, discovery is governed not by a
In re Krakauer, 81 N.J. 32, 34, 404 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1979).
See In re Heywood, 98 N.J 410, 419-20, 486 A.2d 1256, 1260 (1985).
See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-1(a); OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 12
(service of complaint at respondent's last known address). See also In re Goer, 100
N.J. 529, 535, 497 A.2d 1255, 1258 (1985) (ethics matter adjudicated even though
respondent did not cooperate or participate in proceedings).
203 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(1)(3).
204 Id. R. 1:20-3(o).
205 Id. R. 1:20-3(1)(3).
206 Prior to adoption of rule amendments on November 7, 1988, effective January
2, 1989, rule 1:20-30) stated that the grievant's attorney may be designated the
presenter in the DEC Chair's discretion, but the supreme court in In re Hecker, 109
N.J. 539, 538 A.2d 354 (1988), stated that where the grievant has a financial interest
in matters that are the subject of disciplinary proceedings, that party's counsel
"should not be appointed to represent the interests of the public in the disciplinary
proceedings." Id. at 554, 538 A.2d at 361. Interestingly, the court failed to mention or cite the aforesaid rule which its opinion then contradicted. The recently
amended rule now conforms to the holding in Hecker. See 1988 ProposedRules, supra
note 177, at 124, col. 1.
207 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(i).
208 Id.
200
201
202

209

Id.

210

Id. Discovery of respondent's financial books and records, required to be

1988]

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

587

specific court rule, but under the guidelines issued by the Director. 21

1

Discovery generally includes information and material in

the custody of the presenter or the DEC as follows: the names
and addresses of all witnesses; copies of witness statements; inspection and copying of non-privileged documents and records;
copies of investigative reports; identification of expert witnesses
and copies of expert reports; and such other material as the DEC
Chair may direct on motion and a showing of good cause.2 12
Neither the rules nor the guidelines provide for any discovery of the grievant. However, in In re Katz,213 the New Jersey
Supreme Court commented that ethics discovery could include
the depositions of absent witnesses. 214 Thus, where the circumstances require, a motion must be made to the DEC Chair for the
taking of depositions of the grievant or other witnesses. Further,
in In re Rogovoy,2 15 the court stated that respondent's counsel may
interview the grievant and other witnesses in preparation of a defense.2 16 However, respondent ordinarily should not communicate directly with the grievant or with adverse witnesses. Such
contact can lead to 2charges
of interference, improper pressure or
17
witness tampering.
The respondent may also subpoena witnesses and materials. 2 18 The guidelines provide that wide latitude be given in the
issuance of subpoenas for relevant information during the investigation and hearing phases. 219 However, the issuance of subpoenas is at the discretion of the ethics authorities, and under the
guidelines no interlocutory appeal is permitted from a refusal to
maintained under rule 1:21-6, are discoverable by ethics authorities on demand
pursuant to rule 1:21- 6 (g) and the Random Audit Compliance Program. See supra
note 120.
211 See OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 15.
212 Id. Discovery responses are due within 25 days from the due date of respondent's answer and extensions are not given absent "extraordinary good cause." Id.,
Guideline No. 16. Court rule 1:3-4(a), allowing parties to consent to extensions of
time, is not applicable. See N.J. CT. R. 1:3-4(a). If either of the parties fails to identify an expert witness or provide copies of relevant reports, the guideline specifically provides that the expert may be barred from testifying at the hearing. OAE
Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 15. Therefore, no time should be wasted
in retaining experts on behalf of the respondent.
213 90 N.J. 272, 447 A.2d 916 (1982).
214 Id. at 274 n.2, 447 A.2d at 917 n.2 (1982).
215 30 N.J. 1, 152 A.2d 1 (1959).
216 Id. at 5, 152 A.2d at 3.
217 Id. (supreme court recommended immediate retention of counsel, who can
then interview all witnesses, including grievant).
218 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-3(o); OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 14.
219 OAE Guidelines, supra note 32, Guideline No. 14.
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issue a subpoena.22 ° Once issued, motions to quash, limit or
otherwise protect witnesses are entertained by the DEC Chair or
panel chair. 22 '
While there are some similarities between discovery under
the guidelines in ethics matters and discovery in criminal matters,
criminal defendants have broader discovery rights. For example,
prosecutors upon request must specifically designate which witness may be called by the State at trial.222 Defendants in criminal
matters are also entitled to be advised of any alleged admissions
223
or declarations against interest even if not reduced to writing.
In civil cases, this same type of information is usually available
through interrogatories and depositions.224
Respondents in ethics proceedings should be entitled to discovery at least to the same extent as are criminal defendants.
The result in an ethics proceeding should not be susceptible to
influence by gamesmanship and surprise. Respondents should
be entitled under the court rules to know which witnesses may be
called to testify against them at the hearing and whether the presenter believes that admissions or declarations against interest
have been made by the respondent. The respondent's counsel
should request such information notwithstanding the failure of
the rules and guidelines to address these important concerns.
D.

The Crucial Role of Counsel for the Accused

As discussed in this article, respondents in ethics proceedings are not afforded the same due process as litigants in other
forums. The need for experienced ethics defense counsel is,
therefore, heightened.
Miranda warnings are, of course, not required to be given in
ethics matters. 225 If Miranda-like warnings were required, such
warnings would, in part, provide:
220 Id. Unlike subpoenas issued in other types of proceedings, respondent's
counsel cannot issue a subpoena over the name of the clerk or the committee. The
subpoenas must be approved and issued by the ethics authorities. See id.
221 Id.

222 N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(a)(7).
223 Id. R. 3:13-3(a)(2).
224 See generally id. R. 4:10-1 to 4:23-5.
225 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (warnings required to be given
prior to custodial interrogation). Ethics offenders are not placed in custody, though
they may be no less compelled to provide information. See N.J. RULES OF PROFES-

SIONAL CONDUCT Rules 8.1, 8.3. Compulsion, for example, is an inherent aspect of
the Random Audit Program, where attorneys are called upon at their offices to answer questions concerning bookkeeping discrepancies.
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1. You do not have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can be used against you, and your refusal to
say anything can also be used against you.
3. You do not have the explicit right to the presence of an attorney during questioning; once a formal complaint is filed
appointment of counsel upon
against you, you can22 request
6
proof of indigency.

Under these prevailing circumstances, the respondent under investigation or against whom a formal complaint has been lodged may
not be able to adequately represent himself regardless of legal acumen. Experienced ethics defense counsel may be necessary to act as
a needed buffer between respondent and the ethics authorities and
the grievant.
Experienced litigators, champions on familiar civil and criminal
battlegrounds, might easily fall victim on the treacherous turf of the
sui generis mine field. Even the current OAE Director cautions that
once a formal complaint has been filed the accused attorney should
immediately secure counsel.22 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that, where interviewing of the grievant and other adverse witnesses is deemed necessary in preparation of respondent's defense, counsel should be
retained. 221 Once a grievance has been filed, the attorney-client relationship has, of course, deteriorated to one of adversity, and further contact between the two is ill-advised. Moreover, direct contact
between the respondent and the grievant could result in the filing of
additional ethics charges of undue pressure, coercion or witness
tampering.
The respondent is best served by displaying candor and cooperation throughout the proceedings. The pro se respondent must
walk a tightrope. It is difficult to be a zealous advocate and yet simultaneously appear candid and contrite. This is particularly true
in serious cases where the respondent is exposed to suspension or
disbarment. Emotions naturally run high when one's veracity and
competence are questioned and one's reputation and livelihood may
be at stake. Retained counsel can more easily remain dispassionate
and conduct a rational, effective defense. 2 9 Counsel can assert
See supra notes 65 and 85, and text accompanying notes 168-97.
Johnson, supra note 29, at 344, col. 5.
In re Rogovoy, 30 N.J. 1, 5, 152 A.2d 1, 3 (1959). See also supra notes 215-17,
and accompanying text.
229 Nordby, supra note 140, at 446. The author correctly observes:
For-irrlevant as it may seem to a lawyer's mind-an important ingredient in the final disposition of the charge will be respondent's performance in the disciplinary proceeding itself. For this reason any
226
227
228
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rights, which, if asserted by respondent personally, might seem con2 30
trived and self-serving.
Many lawyers believe that they possess the oratorical agility to
explain themselves out of almost any predicament. However, pro se
respondents, in attempting to explain themselves out of one ethics
charge, often explain themselves into another. Just as a good criminal lawyer will rarely advise his client to take the stand, it is generally ill-advised for the respondent to espouse his own innocence.
Respondents must keep in mind that the presenters have the
resources and staff of the OAE at their disposal. Furthermore, if the
OAE takes an active role in the case, the respondent will be opposed
by experienced, full-time OAE staff attorneys who are infinitely
more familiar with the rules and precedents.
It is often said that the attorney who represents himself has a
fool for a client. This timeless proverb can apply with no greater
force than in ethics proceedings involving the potential for public
discipline.
IV.

CONFIDENTIALITY: SWORD OR SHIELD?

Ethics "records" and "proceedings" are required to remain
confidential at the first and second tiers of the disciplinary framework. 2 3 1 The confidentiality requirement can be both a help and
a hindrance to respondents. The policy protects respondents
from unnecessary and premature publicity but prevents respondents from having access to relevant case precedents.
A.

Scope of Confidentiality

In State v. Stroger,2 32 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that the "records" that are to be kept confidential are those
records which are created during disciplinary proceedings rather
than business and client records maintained by the respondent.2 3 3 The court in Stroger stated that the confidentiality requirement was not intended to shield a respondent's unethical or
criminal conduct.2 3 4 When an attorney's records are validly obtained in the course of an ethics investigation or audit, and evirespondent, any, at least charged with relatively serious misconduct,
whether the charge is true or unfounded, is badly in need of informed
and disinterested counsel.
230 See id.

231 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-10 and 1:21-6(c), (g).
232 97 NJ. 391, 478 A.2d 1175 (1984).
233 Id. at 401, 478 A.2d at 1179-80. See NJ. CT. R. 1:20-10 (formerly R. 1:21-6).
234 Id. at 402, 478 A.2d at 1180.
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dence of possible criminal wrongdoing comes to the attention of
ethics or law enforcement authorities, the relevant records may
be turned over to law enforcement authorities on ten-days notice
to the respondent.23 5
All ethics "proceedings" are required to be kept confidential
except (1) upon scheduling of oral argument for final discipline
before the supreme court, (2) where respondent has requested or
consented to disclosure, or (3) upon the entry of final orders of
discipline by the supreme court. 3 6 Where ethics proceedings
are based upon criminal convictions or where allegations of impropriety are deemed by the Director to be of general public
knowledge, the Director may in his discretion publicly disclose
the pendency of the related ethics proceedings. 3 7 Where a temporary suspension has been imposed or upon entry of final discipline, the Director may refer confidential documentary
information to other jurisdictions where the respondent is admitted to practice. 3 8
All argument before the supreme court in ethics matters is
heard in open court.2 3 9 Thus, where a matter is initially brought
before the court by the Direqtor on an emergent application for
license restricture or temporary suspension, members of the
public may be present. If the court entertains a motion at any
stage by either party, argument, if heard, occurs in open court,
and members of the public are not excluded. In a case where the
respondent's anticipated exposure is a private reprimand, the respondent's zeal to raise a constitutional issue, which issues are
cognizable only by the supreme court, will be chilled by the potential for otherwise avoidable publicity.
Once a charge is proven and final public discipline imposed,
the opinion and order is published in the NewJersey LawJournal
and reported in the New Jersey Reports. In cases resulting in
dismissals or the imposition of private reprimands, the entire record remains confidential.2 40 As discussed below, a more uniform
system for the anonymous reporting of all ethics decisions would
Id. at 413, 478 A.2d at 1186. See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-10(d).
N.J. CT. R. 1:20-10(a)(1)-(3).
Id. R. 1:20-10(b).
Id. R. 1:20-10(c). Such referred information is to be kept confidential by the
recipient and used only for disciplinary purposes. Id. Most jurisdictions impose
reciprocal discipline, and New Jersey is no exception. See generally id. R. 1:20-7.
Note also that temporary suspension orders are published in the New Jersey Law
Journal and the New Jersey Reports.
239 See 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 6.
240 Id. at 65-66.
235
236
237
238
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continue to serve the public interest without inflicting unnecessary humiliation upon the transgressing attorney, his family and
his descendants.2 4 '
B. Purpose and Benefits of Confidentiality
The purpose of the confidentiality requirement is ostensibly
to protect the respondent from unfavorable inferences pending
the final stages of the proceedings before the supreme court.24 2
The NewJersey Supreme Court has recognized that "even an unsubstantiated charge can, if misunderstood, do irreparable dam-3
24
age to an attorney without any corresponding public benefit.
Confidentiality in disciplinary matters is also beneficial to the
grievant, whose legal affairs thereby escape notoriety.
C. Adverse Consequences of Confidentiality
The benefits of confidentiality are not without their price,
however. Grievants, clients and witnesses are afforded absolute
immunity from suit by respondents for abuse of process and malicious prosecution, 244 so long as they abide by the confidentiality
requirement.24 5 If a participant in an ethics proceeding breaches
the confidentiality rules, forfeiture of immunity
will result, and
24 6
court.
the
by
imposed
be
may
sanctions
Another detrimental ramification of the confidentiality rule
is inaccessibility to private reprimand decisions and dismissals. A
substantial portion of ethics matters result in the imposition of
See infra notes 250-55, and accompanying text.
State v. Stroger, 97 N.J. 391, 409, 478 A.2d 1175, 1184 (1984).
In re Skevin, 104 NJ. 476, 487, 517 A.2d 852, 858 (1986).
N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11 (b). Committee members and staff are also afforded immunity for conduct in the performance of their ethics duties. Id. R. 1:20-11 (a). For an
interesting discussion of the history of immunity in ethics proceedings, see generally In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 NJ. 669, 477 A.2d 339
(1984); Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671 (1955). Immunity extends to
all communications to ethics authorities as well as testimony given in ethics proceedings. N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11(b).
245 In re Skevin, 104 N.J. at 487-88, 517 A.2d at 857-58. In Skevin, the grievant
deliberately breached the confidentiality rules, and the respondent moved before
the special ethics master for dismissal. The master ruled dismissal inappropriate
due to the public interest involved in such proceedings. The supreme court
agreed. The grievant's rights were not affected because the court chose to apply
the forfeiture and sanction policy prospectively. Skevin was disbarred for misappropriation of trust funds. Id. at 489, 517 A.2d at 859.
246 Id., at 488, 517 A.2d at 858. Court rule 1:20-10(e), adopted November 7,
1988, provides for holding a person in "contempt of the Supreme Court" in addition to loss of immunity for breaching the confidentiality requirement. N.J. Ct. R.
1:20-10(e); see also 1988 Proposed Rules, supra note 177, at 126, col. 1.
241
242
243
244
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private reprimands,247 and many matters are ultimately dismissed
without the imposition of discipline, thus rendering the relevant
records, transcripts, recommendations and decisions perpetually
inviolate. The OAE, DRB and the supreme court have at their
disposal all of the recommendations and decisions in cases terminating in non-public discipline. The DEC's also have available
for reference all private reprimand decisions for matters originating from their respective districts. Furthermore, the DEC's receive legal and procedural advice from the OAE 24 1 which may
include information on the disposition of other analogous cases.
The respondents, however, do not have access to this vast pool of
case precedents.
Respondents have access only to the forty to sixty reported
decisions rendered annually, i.e., those ending in the imposition
of public discipline.2 49 Respondents are, therefore, unable to
compare their conduct to the conduct of other attorneys who
have received private reprimands or who have been ultimately
vindicated. Thus, ethics defense counsel are often at a disadvantage in arguing for the imposition of private sanctions on behalf
of their clients. Counsel are forced to contend in a given case
that, since there are no analogous reported cases, private discipline is appropriate. While ethics matters are each decided upon
their own particular facts on a case-by-case basis, it would nonetheless be extremely helpful for respondents to be able to cite
analogous cases and refer the DEC panel, DRB or the supreme
court to analogous circumstances where private discipline or dismissal was deemed appropriate.
D.

Proposalfor Anonymous Publication of Disciplinary Decisions

In other areas of the law, decisions are ordinarily available
for review, reference and citation.250 In cases where anonymity
247 See 1987 OAE REPORT, supra note 18, at 65, figure 25. In 1986, 43 cases resulted in the imposition of a private reprimand, while 53 cases resulted in the imposition of public sanctions; in 1987, 20 private reprimands were issued and public
discipline was imposed in 55 cases. Id. at 57, figure 20; id. at 65, figure 25.
248 See supra note 130.
249 Seven hundred-eighty five cases were disposed of during 1987. See 1987 OAE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 47. Of that total, only 55 cases resulted in public discipline. Id. at 56.
250 While not all civil and criminal decisions are reported, the Bar has access to a
broad cross-section of case precedent covering the gamut of possibilities of circumstances and results. Even so, the Bar has clamored for greater access to decisional
law. See Adler, Bar Contests Lack of Access to Unpublished Opinions, 120 N.J.L.J. 309
(1987).

594

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:554

has been deemed appropriate, such as matters involving custody
of juveniles, anonymity is achieved by captioning cases with the
" ' There is no reainitials of the parties rather than their names.25
son why ethics matters could not be captioned by letter or
number and the parties anonymously referred to throughout as
"grievant" and "respondent.

2 52

One commentator has suggested that all disciplinary proceedings be captioned anonymously, i.e., numerically, "to save
respondents the perpetual ignominy of having their names forever imbedded in the law reports, a continuing disgrace visited
upon no other profession, not even upon criminal defendants
who do not appeal.

' 25 3

Another has opined, however, that all

disciplinary matters beyond the investigative stage should
be en254
tirely public in nature to protect the public interest.
Decisions and orders of the court identifying respondents
could still be published at the time of entry in cases where public
reprimands, suspensions and disbarments are imposed, but the
reported decisions could then be published in the New Jersey Reports by number rather than name. The initial publication of the
respondents' identities would adequately serve the public's need
to know.
Decisions presently unavailable involving private reprimands
or dismissals can also be made uniformly available to the Bar and
the public through anonymous reporting, thereby serving the deterrent purpose of educating the Bar as to conduct deemed unethical, and additionally making available to the Bar and ethics
defense counsel the full range of ethics precedents.2 55
Ethics opinions should not remain secret, thereby unfairly
available only to ethics authorities. Neither the Bar nor the public should be forced to resort to guesswork where a colleague's
reputation, livelihood and future may be in jeopardy. The anonSee, e.g., In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
The Opinions of the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics are rendered
anonymously and designated by number. See N.J. CT. R. 1:19-4.
253 Nordby, supra note 140, at 401. Nordby submits that anonymity would also
remove a deterrent to lawyers volunteering information about their own problems,
such as alcoholism, and that anonymity may enhance the profession's perception of
the fairness of the system. Id.
254 Note, Enforcement of Legal Ethics in New Jersey, 28 RurTGERs L. REv. 707, 718-19
(1975). The author suggests that a bureau be established in which all disciplinary
records can be maintained for public access and reference, analogous to a better
business bureau. Id.
255 See Norby, supra note 140, at 401. See also Note, supra note. 254, at 712-13,
718-19.
251
252
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ymous publication of all ethics decisions rendered by the DRB
and the court would serve the public interest, provide a deterrent, better educate the Bar, and avoid unnecessary perpetual
embarrassment.
V.

CONCLUSION

As one learned ethics practitioner, Jack S. Nordby, observed:
[R]espondent's counsel must struggle as best he can in a constitutional wonderland where a petty criminal is vouchsafed
the full panoply of constitutional protections, where the state
and federal courts and juries can be mobilized to resolve a few
dollars in dispute, but where a colleague threatened with ruin
looks in vain for similar facilities. 25 6
As discussed above, the sui geners label results in the accused
attorney being afforded due process measured by a lower standard
than that afforded petty criminals. Respondents' lack of access to a
substantial portion of ethics case precedents compounds the difficulties experienced in defending against ethics charges.
The recent disbarment by the supreme court of two prominent
practitioners over the contrary recommendations of the DRB, occasioned strong dissenting opinions by Justice O'Hern, and sparked
debate among bar officials and lawyers throughout the State concerning the fairness of disciplinary proceedings. 2 57 While it is crucial that disciplinary rules and procedures be facially fair and convey
the impression of evenhandedness, it is equally critical that the discipline imposed thereunder be fair in fact. The system works best
when the Bar, as well as the public, places complete confidence in it.
It is time for all concerned to recognize and appreciate that,
regardless of the labelling of ethics proceedings as something other
than penal, the sanctions imposed can be devastating to the respondent and his or her family. Notwithstanding the jurisprudential linguistics, discipline exacts punishment. Often, the adverse
ramifications of public discipline far exceed the consequences of
conviction in a petty disorderly persons matter. Yet the petty criminal is cloaked in constitutional armor while the accused attorney
must struggle to forge a shield from meager resources.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey is the fulcrum in the ethics
movement. Over the past fifteen years, the pendulum has swung in
one direction in reaction to the public's negative perception of lawyers-a perception which was engendered by well publicized and
256
257

Norby, supra note 140, at 394.
See O'Brien, Court Disbars Conway, Rigolosi in 4-1 Vote, 119 NJ.LJ. 1077 (1987).
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scandalous cases such as the notorious nolo contendere plea of Spiro
T. Agnew and his subsequent disbarment.2 8 Certainly, many of the
reforms implemented by the New Jersey Supreme Court were
needed and welcome, and New Jersey can be proud to be in the
vanguard of continuing efforts to improve the reputation of the Bar
and the prompt punishment of deserving offenders. The number of
ethics grievances filed annually has decreased dramatically since
1983.259 Having achieved greater accountability, it is time for the
pendulum to swing back toward equanimity.
258 See Manning, If Lawyers Were Angels: A Sermon in One Canon, 60 A.B.A.J. 821, 822
(1974). See also supra note 4.
259 See Rosenblum, Grievances on Ethics Plummeting, 121 N.J.L.J. 873 (1988)
("While the number of active attorneys in New Jersey has soared almost 36 percent
since 1983, the amount of ethics grievances filed over the same time span has
dropped 40 percent .... ").

